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Abstract
Gale and Sotomayor (1985) have shown that in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm
(1962), the proposed-to side W (referred to as women there) can strategically force the
W -optimal stable matching as theM -optimal one by truncating their preference lists, each
woman possibly blacklisting all but one man. As Gusfield and Irving have already noted
in 1989, no results are known regarding achieving this feat by means other than such
preference-list truncation, i.e. by also permuting preference lists.
We answer Gusfield and Irving’s open question by providing tight upper bounds on
the amount of blacklists and their combined size, that are required by the women to force
a given matching as theM -optimal stable matching, or, more generally, as the unique sta-
ble matching. Our results show that the coalition of all women can strategically force any
matching as the unique stable matching, using preference lists in which at most half of
the women have nonempty blacklists, and in which the average blacklist size is less than 1.
This allows the women to manipulate the market in a manner that is far more inconspicu-
ous, in a sense, than previously realized. When there are less women than men, we show
that in the absence of blacklists for men, the women can force any matching as the unique
stable matching without blacklisting anyone, while when there are more women than men,
each to-be-unmatched woman may have to blacklist as many as all men. Together, these
results shed light on the question of how much, if at all, do given preferences for one side
a priori impose limitations on the set of stable matchings under various conditions. All of
the results in this paper are constructive, providing efficient algorithms for calculating the
desired strategies.
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1 Introduction
Gale and Shapley (1962), in their seminal paper, have introduced the question of finding a
matching between a set of women W and a set of men M , that is, a one-to-one mapping
between a subset of W (the women matched by this matching) and a subset of M (the men
matched by this matching), that satisfies certain desirable properties.1 Such W and M , along
with preferences for each participant, comprise a two-sidedmatching market. Over the past few
decades, applications of matching markets have become widespread, from assigning medical
interns to hospitals (Roth, 1984) and students to high schools (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005a,b),
to centralizing kidney donation assignments (Roth et al., 2005).
In Gale and Shapley’s model, each woman has a strict order of preference over a subset
of M . This subset, ordered according to her order of preference, is called the preference list of
this woman, and is interpreted as those men with whom she would prefer to be matched over
being matched with no-one. Each man similarly has a preference list of women.
Definition 1 (Blacklist). The blacklist of a woman w is the set of all men that are not in her
preference list, i.e. the men that w finds unacceptable, even when the alternative is being un-
matched (i.e. being matched with no-one). The blacklist of a man is defined analogously.
Definition 2 (Individual Rationality). A matching is M -rational if no man is matched with
a woman from his blacklist; it is W -rational if no woman is matched with a man from her
blacklist.
A matching is unstable under the given orders of preference if either (i) it is notW -rational,
or notM -rational, or (ii) there exist a woman and a man, each of whom prefer being matched
with the other over the partner (or lack thereof) assigned to them by the matching. A matching
that is not unstable is stable; Gale and Shapley (1962) have proved that a stable matching always
exists, and have presented an efficient algorithm for finding such a matching.
While in some cases only a single stable matching exists, in general there are many sta-
ble matchings, differing significantly in the outcome for the various participants (Pittel, 1989).
Gale and Shapley have shown that their algorithm finds the M -optimal stable matching, i.e.
a stable matching over which no man prefers any other stable matching. McVitie and Wil-
son (1971) have additionally shown that this matching is at the same time theW -worst stable
matching, i.e. a stable matching that is worst for each woman. The benefits of the Gale-Shapley
matching algorithm for the men have been demonstrated even further by Dubins and Freed-
man (1981), who have shown that no man can unilaterally strategically manipulate this algo-
rithm (i.e. manipulate the M -optimal stable matching) to his advantage and, moreover, that
no coalition of men can all benefit from jointly manipulating it.2 These observations have led
to the study by Gale and Sotomayor (1985) of strategic manipulations of the algorithm, and of
stable matchings in general, by women.
Gale and Sotomayor (1985) have shown that if more than one stable matching exists, then
at least one woman can unilaterally manipulate the M -optimal stable matching to her own
advantage. Moreover, they have shown that the coalition of all women can force theW -optimal
stable matching as the unique stable matching, and thus as the M -optimal stable matching
(and the outcome of the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm), by truncating their preference lists,
each woman blacklisting all men over whom she prefers her W -optimal stable partner. Note
that this strategymay lead to each woman blacklisting all but oneman (i.e. declaring a blacklist
of size |M |−1), which makes the women’s manipulation painfully obvious to any observer of
1Gale and Shapley have studied one-to-many matchings that generalize the scenario described here, as well
as one-to-one matchings under the condition |W |= |M |. The scenario that we describe, of one-to-one matchings
between sets of possibly-unequal size, was first explicitly studied by McVitie and Wilson (1970).
2The interested reader is referred to Demange et al. (1987) for an even stronger nonmanipulability theorem, and
to Huang (2006) for the study of lying by men in a probabilistic setting.
1
their submitted preferences. Despite the extensive literature regarding stable matchings and
manipulation, as Gusfield and Irving (1989, pp. 59,65) have already noted in 1989, no results
are known regarding achieving this feat by means other than such preference-list truncation,
i.e. by also permuting preference lists.
As it is widely believed that successful matching mechanisms should produce stable out-
comes (Roth, 2002), many real-life matching mechanisms (even those not based on Gale and
Shapley’s algorithm) are designed with the goal of producing stable matchings. Therefore, the
ability to force some matching as the unique stable matching is of broad significance.
In Section 4, we answer Gusfield and Irving’s open question by tightly characterizing the
worst-case amount of blacklists and their sizes, that are required by the women to force the
W -optimal stable matching (or more generally, any M -rational matching) as the unique sta-
ble matching, and in particular as the outcome of the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm. We
start by analysing perfect matchings, i.e. matchings in which no participant is unmatched. A
corollary of our results for this case is as follows.
Theorem 1 (Weaker version of Theorem 4; the latter is shown to be tight in Theorem 5).
1. When |W |= |M |, the coalition of all women can force any M -rational perfect matching as the
unique stable matching, using a profile of preference lists in which at most half of the women
have blacklists, and in which the average blacklist size is less than 1.
2. This profile of preference lists can be computed in O(n3) time.
This low upper bound of less than 1 on the average blacklist size that is guaranteed by
Theorem 1 should be contrasted with the previously-known upper bound of |M |−1, which
is attainable using truncation, as mentioned above. Indeed, our results provide a far more
“inconspicuous” manipulation than the one suggested by Gale and Sotomayor using prefer-
ence truncating, even though both manipulations result in the samematching. Thus, if women
have to pay even a small cost for every man that they blacklist, then our solution beats prefer-
ence truncation by an order of magnitude. The manipulation we suggest becomes even more
inconspicuous in implementations where, by design, participants are required to submit pref-
erence lists of at most a certain length, as in the case in some real-life matching markets (see
e.g. Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005a).
It turns out that the case of a balanced market, i.e. |W | = |M |, is a singular case at which
a phase change occurs. When there are less women than men, we show (see Theorems 6
and 7) that in the absence of blacklists for men, the women can always force any M -rational
matching, in which all women are matched, as the unique stable matching without blacklisting
anyone. In contrast, when there are more women than men (or more generally, when not all
women should be matched), each to-be-unmatched woman may have to blacklist as many as
all men. Together, all of these results shed light on the question of howmuch, if at all, do given
preferences for one side a priori impose limitations on the set of stable matchings under various
conditions.
It is interesting to note that Ashlagi et al. (2013) have shown that a somewhat similar phase
change occurs w.r.t. the expected ranking of each participant’s partner in the participant’s pref-
erence list in a randommarket. Both that paper and this one show, in different senses, that the
preferences of the smaller side of the market, even if it is only slightly smaller, play a far more
significant role than may be expected in determining the stable matchings, and those of the
larger side — a considerably insignificant one. In a sense, our results extend this qualitative
statement from a random market to anymarket.
Another implication of our results is in goods allocation problems, i.e. matching problems
in which only one side (the buyers) has preferences, while the other side (the goods) does not.
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) and Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009) consider using a version
of the (student-optimal) Gale-Shapley algorithm in order to allocate school seats to children;
as school priorities are very coarse (and sometimes nonexistent, see e.g. Abdulkadirog˘lu et al.,
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2005a), some tie-breaking rule is needed so that the algorithm can be run. Both of these papers
advocate the use of a single tie-breaking rule for all schools (e.g. a single lottery conducted
once before the algorithm runs, to assign each student a number to be used for tie breaking
at every school) over a different tie-breaking rule for each school (e.g. a different lottery for
each school), arguing that the former results in higher social welfare. Our results strengthen
this argument and make it even more concrete, showing that in goods allocation problems,
an implementation using multiple arbitrary (e.g. randomized) tie-breaking rules may yield
any allocation that is buyer-rational, regardless of the internal orders of the buyer’s preference
lists, if even an amortized less-than-one-buyer blacklist per good is allowed (or even in the ab-
sence any blacklists for the goodswhatsoever, if there are more buyers than goods); in contrast,
it is easy to see that an implementation with a single tie-breaking rule is equivalent to serial
dictatorship (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998), and thus e.g. constructs Pareto-efficient al-
locations.
While Theorem 1 guarantees an average blacklist size of less than 1, it provides no guaran-
tee regarding the size of each individual blacklist. Indeed, it may be the case (see Theorem 5)
that in order to force a particular matching, one of the women is required to blacklist all but
one man, while all the other women’s blacklists are empty. In Section 5, we introduce a nat-
ural variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, in which blacklisting is a dynamic process called
divorcing; this variant, which we call the Gale-Shapley algorithm with divorces, is exactly as ma-
nipulable as the unaltered Gale-Shapley algorithm (see Proposition 8 for the precise sense). We
characterize the worst-case pattern of divorces in this variant, and show that the coalition of
all women can force any matching as the outcome by at most n−1 women getting divorced,
each exactly once (see Theorem 9). This result is shown to be tight as well (see Theorem 10).
All of the results in this paper are constructive, providing efficient algorithms for calculat-
ing the desired strategies; full proofs for all theorems are given in the appendix. While the
proofs are involved, the resulting algorithms are relatively simple to describe.
2 Additional Related Work
A participant with a nonempty blacklist is often said in the literature to have an incomplete
preference list (not to be confused with a partial order of preferences, which indicates an indif-
ference of sorts between certain alternatives). Kobayashi and Matsui (2009) study the same
problem as we do, yet confined only to a balanced market, and give a necessary and sufficient
condition (on the men’s preferences and the desiredmatching) for a solution with no blacklists
whatsoever to exist; they also give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a solution (i.e.
women’s strategies) when this condition holds.
Manipulations by a single woman of the (men-proposing) Gale-Shapley algorithm have
been extensively studied. Notably relevant to our setting is the study of Teo et al. (2001), who
give an efficient algorithm for finding an optimal strategy (preference list) for a single woman
(with given true preferences) when blacklists are not allowed, given the submitted preference
lists of the rest of the market; they note that it is not always possible for such a woman to
obtain her top choice under this setting. They also give simulation results suggesting that the
proportion of women who can gain by manipulation in a random market approaches zero
as the market grows; Kojima and Pathak (2009) indeed prove that even when blacklists are
allowed and even in a many-men-to-one-woman setting, the proportion of women who can
gain by manipulation in a randommarket, when the lengths of men’s preference lists are fixed,
tends to zero as the market grows. In a contrast of sorts, since Pittel (1992) shows that in a
random market each participant w.h.p. has more than one stable partner, each woman w.h.p.
benefits (and no woman is ever harmed) if all women form a coalition and force theW -optimal
stable matching.
Bridging the gap between manipulation by a single woman and manipulation by all
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women is manipulation by a coalition of women. Gonczarowski and Friedgut (2013) show
that even when blacklists are allowed and even in many-to-many settings, if a coalition of
womenmanipulates the (men-proposing) Gale-Shapley algorithm in a way that harms none of
them, then no truthful woman is harmed either and no man gains. Coalitional manipulation is
also studied by Huang (2006), who studies incentives for manipulation of the (men-proposing)
Gale-Shapley algorithm by coalitions of men.
Pini et al. (2011) show that in the absence of blacklists, there exists a stable mechanism that
is computationally-hard to manipulate by a single participant. As our results yield a unique
stable matching, they hold for any stable mechanism, and so show in a sense that their results
do not carry over to the case of manipulation by an entire side of the market if even very small
blacklists are allowed. Eeckhout (2000) gives a sufficient condition for uniqueness of a stable
matching in the absence of blacklists; our results produce a unique stable matching, yet do not
meet this sufficient condition, even if this condition is extended to a setting with blacklists by
adding additional participants denoting an unmatched status.
3 Model and Preliminaries
In order to standardize the notation used throughout this paper, and for self-containment, let
us quickly recapitulate the definitions from the previous section, as well as the Gale-Shapley
algorithm (1962). Let W and M be disjoint finite sets, referred to as the sets of women and
men, respectively.
Definition 3 (Preference Lists; Blacklists; Combined Blacklist Size).
1. A preference list for a woman w ∈W is a totally-ordered subset ofM .
2. A profile of preference lists forW is a specification of a preference list for each w∈W .
3. Given a profile PW of preference lists for W , the blacklist of a woman w ∈ W , denoted
by Bw(PW ), is the set of men inM who do not appear in w’s preference list (i.e. all men
who are declared unacceptable by w). We say that w blacklists the men in Bw(PW ).
4. The combined size of all blacklists in PW is defined to be
∑
w∈W
∣∣Bw(PW )
∣∣.
We define preference lists, profiles of preference list, and blacklists forM analogously.
Definition 4 (Matching). A matching is a one-to-one mapping between a subset of W and a
subset of M . By slight abuse of notation, we denote the woman matched with a man m by
a matching µ by µ(m) instead of µ−1(m). Given a matching µ, we define the subset of W
(resp.M ) on which µ is defined asWµ (resp.Mµ). IfWµ = W andMµ = M , then we say that µ
is perfect; otherwise, we say that µ is partial.
Throughout the remainder of this section, let PW and PM be profiles of preference lists
forW andM , respectively.
Definition 5 (Individual Rationality; Stability). Let µ be a matching.
1. µ is said to be G-rational, for a side G ∈ {W,M}, if µ(p) /∈ Bp(PG) for every matched
participant p∈Gµ.
2. µ is said to be unstable w.r.t PW and PM , if either it is not W -rational or notM -rational,
or there exist a woman w∈W and a man m∈M that do not blacklist each other, each of
whom either unmatched in µ, or preferring the other over the partner matched to them
by µ.
3. If µ is not unstable, then it is said to be stable.
Definition 6 (The Gale-Shapley Algorithm (1962)). The following algorithm is henceforth re-
ferred to as the Gale-Shapley algorithm:3 The algorithm is divided into steps, to which we refer
3The semantics of the algorithm that we describe w.r.t. blacklists are slightly different than those of Gale and
Shapley’s original algorithm. Nonetheless, the outcome is the same by a theorem of Dubins and Freedman (1981).
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as nights. On each night, each man serenades under the window of the woman he prefers most
among all women who have not (yet) rejected him and who are not in his blacklist (if such a
woman exists), and then eachwoman, underwhosewindowmore than oneman serenades, re-
jects every man who serenades under her window, except for the man she prefers most among
these men; any woman under whose window serenade only men from her blacklist, rejects all
of these men. The algorithm stops on a night on which no man is rejected by any woman, and
then each woman under whose window a man has serenaded on this night is matched to this
man. Other women are unmatched (as are men who have not serenaded under any window
on this night).
Theorem 2 (Gale and Shapley (1962)). The Gale-Shapley algorithm stops and yields a stable match-
ing between W andM (in particular, such a matching exists), and this stable matching isM -optimal,
i.e. no stable matching is better for any man.
Theorem 2 states that the stable matching given by the Gale-Shapley algorithm is optimal
(out of all stable matchings) for each man. A conceptually-reverse claim holds regarding the
women:
Theorem 3 (McVitie and Wilson (1971)). No stable matching is worse for any woman than the
matching given by the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
In particular, if both the Gale-Shapley algorithm as described above, and the Gale-Shapley
algorithm with reverse roles (i.e. with women serenading to men, yielding theW -optimal sta-
ble matching), yield the same matching, then this matching is the unique stable matching.
4 Blacklists
4.1 Perfect Matchings
Example 1 (Forcing by men of any matching as theM -optimal stable matching). LetW andM
be equal-sized sets of women and men, respectively. Let µ be a matching and let PM be any
profile of preference lists forM in which each man m’s top choice is µ(m). For any profile PW
of preference lists for W according to which µ is W -rational, the M -optimal stable matching
(yield by the Gale-Shapley algorithm) is µ.
Gale and Sotomayor (1985) have shown that women can strategically force theW -optimal
stable matching as theM -optimal one by truncating their preference lists, each woman black-
listing all men over whom she prefers herW -optimal stable partner (without altering the order
of the men remaining in her preference list). If the top choices of all women are distinct, then
the W -optimal stable matching is for each woman to be matched with her top choice. Gale
and Sotomayor’s strategy in this case is for each woman to blacklisting all men but her top
choice. Such a profile of preference lists indeed allows the women to dictate the M -optimal
stable matching a strong sense, as demonstrated by the following example.
Example 2 (Naı¨ve forcing by women of any matching as the M -optimal stable matching).
Let W and M be equal-sized sets of women and men, respectively. Let µ be a matching and
let PW be the profile of preference lists forW in which each woman blacklists all ofM except
for µ(m). For any profile PM of preference lists forM according to which µ isM -rational, the
only stable matching (and thus theM -optimal stable matching) is µ.
As illustrated by Examples 1 and 2, each side can force any “other-side-rational” match-
ing as the M -optimal stable matching, however in order to do so, the women may need to
submit far more specific, and far shorter, preference lists. Indeed, a conspiracy as in Exam-
ple 2, with n , |W | = |M | nonempty blacklists with a combined size of n · (n − 1), would
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be painfully obvious to anyone examining the women’s submitted preference lists. Despite
the extensive literature regarding stable matchings and manipulation, as Gusfield and Irving
(1989, pp. 59,65) have already noted in 1989, no results are known regarding achieving this feat
by means other than such preference-list truncation, i.e. by also permuting preference lists.4
The main result of this paper provides an answer to Gusfield and Irving’s open question,
and shows that if the preferences of all men are known to the women, then the latter can
force any given M -rational matching (and in particular the W -optimal stable matching) as
the unique stable matching (and in particular as the M -optimal stable matching), using a far
smaller combined size for all blacklists, and with significantly less nonempty blacklists than
by using preference-list truncation, rendering the manipulation far less obvious in some sense.
For implementations where, by design, one of the sides is required to submit preference lists
of at most a certain length (see e.g. Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005a), this result allows such a side
to force any matching that is “other-side-rational”, in an even further-inconspicuous way.
Theorem 4 (Manipulation with Minimal Blacklists). Let W and M be equal-sized sets of women
and men, respectively. Define n, |W |= |M |. Let PM be a profile of preference lists for M . For every
M -rational perfect matching µ, there exists a profile PW of preference lists forW , s.t. all of the following
hold.
1. The only stable matching, given PW and PM , is µ.
2. The blacklists in PW are pairwise disjoint, i.e. no man appears in more than one blacklist.
3. nb, the number of women who have nonempty blacklists in PW , is at most
⌊
n
2
⌋
.
4. The combined size of all blacklists in PW is at most n−nb, i.e. at most the number of women who
have empty blacklists.
Furthermore, PW can be computed in worst-caseO(n
3) time, best-caseO(n2) time and average-case
(assuming µ is uniformly distributed given PM ) O(n
2 log n) time.
We note that Theorem 4 guarantees a combined blacklist size no greater than the size of
each of the individual n blacklists from Example 2 — an order-of-magnitude improvement.
Corollary 1 (Upper Bound on Combined Blacklist Size). Under the conditions of Theorem 4, the
combined size of all blacklists in PW is at most n−1, i.e. the average blacklist size is less than 1.
Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 also have implications in goods allocation problems, i.e. match-
ing problems in which only one side (the buyers) has preferences, while the other side (the
goods) does not. Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) and Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009) consider
using a version of the (student-optimal) Gale-Shapley algorithm in order to allocate school
seats to children; as school priorities are very coarse (and sometimes nonexistent, see e.g. Ab-
dulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005a), some tie-breaking rule is needed so that the algorithm can be run.
Both of these papers advocate the use of a single tie-breaking rule for all schools (e.g. a single
lottery conducted once before the algorithm runs, to assign each student a number to be used
for tie breaking at every school) over a different tie-breaking rule for each school (e.g. a differ-
ent lottery for each school), arguing that the former results in higher social welfare. Theorem 4
strengthens this argument and makes it even more concrete, showing that in goods allocation
problems (in the absence of any priorities for the goods), an implementation using multiple
arbitrary (e.g. randomized) tie-breaking rules may yield (for the case of randomization, with
possibly-small, albeit positive, probability) any allocation that is buyer-rational, regardless of
the internal orders of the buyer’s preference lists, if even an amortized less-than-one-buyer
4Manipulations via preference-list truncations generally lend to easier analysis than general manipulations. As
Gale and Sotomayor (1985) show, if a woman’s utility is determined solely by the identity of her partner, then
preference-list truncation is a (weakly) dominant strategy (as we show in this paper, this is no longer the case
if it is preferable to blacklist as few men as possible). The combination of these has led to most of the relevant
literature focusing on manipulation via preference-list truncation. Nonetheless, some results do extend to arbitrary
manipulation, most of them requiring nonstandard proof techniques. (See e.g. Gonczarowski and Friedgut, 2013).
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blacklist per good is allowed (and as we show in the next section, even if no blacklists are
allowed whatsoever, if |W | < |M |); in contrast, it is easy to see that an implementation with
a single tie-breaking rule is equivalent to serial dictatorship, or to random serial dictatorship
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998) if the tie-breaking rule is randomized, and thus e.g. con-
structs Pareto-efficient allocations.
We note that since the combined size of the preference lists ofW as in Theorem 4 is Θ(n2),
then as long as the algorithm for finding them must encode its output explicitly, its time com-
plexity must be Ω(n2). In Theorem 11 in the appendix, we show that attaining Θ(n2) time
complexity is possible in the special case of Theorem 4 in which the top choices of all men are
distinct. Somewhat surprisingly, the analysis and proof for this scenario, in which the men
attempt to force some matching as theM -optimal stable matching a` la Example 1, are simpler
than those of the general case, as is calculating the women’s “response” PW .
5 Thus, in a sense
themen actually inadvertently help thewomenwhenever they try tomanipulate the algorithm
and force some matching as theM -optimal stable matching.
We now show that Theorem 4 is tight in a strong sense, w.r.t. the amount of blacklists and
their sizes. We conclude that Theorem 4 describes an optimal strategy for the women in any
model in which, all assigned partners being equal, the utility of the coalition of women de-
creases as the combined size of their blacklists increases (e.g. if women have to pay even a
small cost for every man that they blacklist). Indeed, in such models Theorem 4 beats prefer-
ence truncation by an order of magnitude.
Theorem 5 (Tightness of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1). Let n ∈ N and letW andM be sets of women
and men, respectively, s.t. |W |= |M |=n. For every 0 ≤ nb ≤
⌊
n
2
⌋
and for every l1, . . . , lnb > 0 s.t.
l1 + · · · + lnb ≤ n − nb, there exist a profile PM of preference lists for M in which all blacklists are
empty, and a perfect matching µ, s.t. both of the following hold.
1. There exists a profile PW of preference lists for W with precisely nb nonempty blacklists, all
pairwise disjoint and of sizes l1, . . . , lnb , s.t. the only stable matching, given PW and PM , is µ.
2. For every profile P ′W of preference lists forW s.t. the only stable matching, given P
′
W and PM , is
µ, there exist nb distinct women w1, . . . , wnb ∈W s.t. |Bwi(P
′
W )| ≥ li for every 0 ≤ i ≤ nb.
Remark 1. Regarding Theorem 5(2),
1. As shown in our proof below, the requirement that the only stable matching, given P ′W
and PM , is µ, may be replaced by the weaker assumption that the M -optimal stable
matching, given P ′W and PM , be µ.
2. No limitations are imposed regarding the number of blacklists in P ′W in which each man
appears; in particular, the blacklists in P ′W need not necessarily be pairwise disjoint.
4.1.1 Proof Outline of Theorem 4
A full proof of Theorem 4 is given in the appendix. The general flow of the proof of is as
follows. We construct a profile of preference lists for W s.t. the top choice of every w ∈ W
is µ(w); thus, the W -optimal stable matching is µ, and it is enough to make sure that the
M -optimal stable matching is µ as well. We construct this profile iteratively.
Assume, for the time being, that the top choices of all men are distinct, i.e. each woman
is serenaded-to on the first night of the Gale-Shapley algorithm by precisely one man (in this
5Moreover, in this special case, while PW naturally depends on PM , if the implementation of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm that is used is the one proposed by Dubins and Freedman (1981), then there exists a scheduling of this
implementation for which the decision of whom each woman prefers or blacklists on each step according to PW
can be taken online. More precisely, both the choice of who acts next, and the action of that participant if that
participant is a woman, depend solely the history of the run (and not on the not-yet-disclosed suffixes of the men’s
preference lists). Thus, if participants are not required to submit their preference lists in advance, but rather only to
dynamically act upon them, then a strategy for the women that forces µ as the only stable matching against every
profilePM of preference lists forM can be constructed for Dubins and Freedman’s implementation of the algorithm,
if the women can control its scheduling; this does not seem to be possible in the general case of Theorem 4.
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case, in the absence of any blacklists for women, the algorithm would stop on the first night).
We pick some woman w˜ who is not matched with µ(w˜), and set her blacklist list so that she
rejects the unique man m serenading under her window on the first night. We adjust the
women’s preferences (see Lemma 7), so thatm is continually rejected until he serenades under
the window of µ(m), who then accepts him, and in turn rejects the man m′ serenading under
her window, who is continually rejected until he serenades under the window of µ(m′), and
so fourth until this rejection cycle concludes with µ(w˜) serenading under the window of w˜. We
note that while w˜ may have rejected (and thus has blacklisted) more than one man during this
rejection cycle, all suchmen are matched with their µ-partners at the end of this rejection cycle,
and in addition so is µ(w˜), whomnowoman blacklisted; in fact, the onlywomanwho blacklists
anyone so far is w˜, and so we have that more men are nowmatched with their µ-partners than
have been blacklisted, so we are “on the right track”, in a sense.
At this point, we would have naı¨vely liked to pick another woman w˜′ who is unmatched
with µ(w˜′), and initiate a similar rejection cycle triggered by her, and so fourth until µ is ob-
tained (arguing that this “cycle-by-cycle” simulation yields theM -optimal stable matching as
well, due to the outcome of the Gale-Shapley algorithm being invariant under certain timing
changes, an invariance established by Dubins and Freedman, 1981). Alas, it is quite possible
that all “nominees” for the role of w˜′ have already rejected quite a fewmen during the previous
rejection cycle (that which was triggered by w˜). In this case, adjusting the preference list of w˜′
to reject the single man serenading under her window entails having her blacklist not only
that man, but also every man she rejected in the previous rejection cycle in favour of this man,
which would not yield the required low combined blacklist size (nor necessarily yield disjoint
blacklists). In this case, we take a step back and “merge” (see Lemma 8) what would have been
the rejection cycle triggered by w˜′ into the previous rejection cycle triggered by w˜, i.e. modify
the preferences of W without blacklisting an “excessive” amount of men, so that the “chain-
reaction” triggered by the rejection of m by w˜, would cause not only all rejections from the
cycle triggered by w˜ (as originally defined), but also the rejections from the cycle that would
have been triggered by w˜′. Luckily, such successive “merging” can be done in an efficient man-
ner, without the need to resimulate rejection cycles after each step. Only when “merging” of
additional rejection cycles is no longer possible (see Lemma 9), do we start another rejection
cycle (see induction step in the proof of Theorem 11), knowing that any woman that we pick
to trigger this new rejection cycle has not yet rejected any man in previous rejection cycles.
In the general case, if we let the Gale-Shapley algorithm run its course (using arbitrary
preferences s.t. eachwomanw prefers µ(w) over any otherman), then by the time the algorithm
halts, it may already be the case that every woman has rejected quite a fewmen, and therefore,
as in the previous case, cannot be used to trigger a rejection cycle without blacklisting an
“excessive” amount of men. In this case, we show (see the induction step in the proof of
Theorem 4) that there exists at least one woman s.t. the rejection cycle that would have been
triggered by her can be “merged” into the run of the algorithm before it has halted, without
blacklisting an “excessive” amount of men. The analysis, and the correspondingmodifications
to the preferences ofW , are considerably more delicate in the case. A side effect is that the time
complexity is also somewhat higher (a worst case of O(n3) instead of O(n2)), however certain
properties of random permutations are used to show that the increment in the average-case
time complexity is considerably less significant (from O(n2) to O(n2 · log n)).
4.2 Partial Matchings
It turns out that the case in which |W |= |M | is a singular case at which a phase change occurs.
If there are more women than men (and therefore not all women are matched in µ), then each
unmatched woman may be required to blacklist as many as all men; in contrast, if there are
more men than women (and therefore not all men are matched in µ), and if the unmatched
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men do not blacklist any woman,6 then no blacklists are whatsoever required, turning the
dichotomy between Examples 1 and 2 on its head. It is interesting to note that Ashlagi et al.
(2013) have shown that a somewhat similar phase change occurs w.r.t. the expected ranking
of each participant’s partner in the participant’s preference list in a random market. Both that
paper and this one show, in different senses, that the preferences of the smaller side of the
market, even if it is only slightly smaller, play a far more significant role than may be expected
in determining the stable matchings, and those of the larger side— a considerably insignificant
one. In a sense, our results extend this qualitative statement from a random market to any
market.
Theorem 6 formalizes the above results, as well as their generalizations for partial match-
ings with both unmatched women and unmatched men. Theorem 7 shows that these results
are also tight in the same strong sense in which Theorem 5 shows that Theorem 4 is tight.
Before we formulate these theorems, we first define some notation.
Definition 7. LetW andM be sets of women and men, respectively. For every W˜ ⊆ W (resp.
M˜ ⊆M ), we define W˜ c = W \ W˜ (resp. M˜ c = M \ M˜ ). (The setW (resp.M ) will be clear from
context.)
Theorem 6 (Manipulation with Minimal Blacklists to obtain a Partial Matching). LetW andM
be sets of women and men of arbitrary sizes, let PM be a profile of preference lists forM , and let µ be a
(possibly-partial) M -rational matching. Define nh ,
∣∣{w ∈Wµ | ∃m ∈M cµ : w /∈ Bm(PM )
}∣∣. There
exists a profile PW of preference lists forW , s.t. all of the following hold.
1. The only stable matching, given PW and PM , is µ.
2. The blacklists ofWµ in PW are pairwise disjoint, and contain only members ofMµ.
3. nb, the number of women inWµ who have nonempty blacklists in PW , is at most
⌊
nµ−nh
2
⌋
.
4. The combined size of the blacklists ofWµ in PW is at most nµ−nh−nb.
Furthermore, PW can be computed in worst-case O
(
max
{
|W | · |M |, (nµ−nh) ·nµ
2
})
time, best-case
O(|W | · |M |) time and average-case O
(
max
{
|W | · |M |, nµ
2 log
nµ+1
nh+1
})
time.
Corollary 2. Under the conditions of Theorem 4,
1. The combined size of all blacklists of Wµ in PW is at most nµ−nh−1 ≤ n−1, i.e. the average
blacklist size ofWµ is less than 1.
2. If all women are matched in µ (i.e. Wµ = W ), and if for each w ∈ W except for perhaps one,
there exists m ∈M cµ who does not blacklist w (e.g. this condition holds if at least one m ∈M
c
µ
blacklists at most one woman), then all blacklists in PW are empty, and PW can be computed in
O
(
|W | · |M |
)
time, which constitutes a tight bound.
Theorem 7 (Tightness of Theorem 6 and Corollary 2). Let W and M be sets of women and men
of arbitrary sizes, and let W˜ ⊆ W and M˜ ⊆ M s.t. |W˜ | = |M˜ |. For each w ∈ W˜ c, let Bw ⊆ M ,
and for each m ∈ M˜ c, let Bm ⊆W . Define nh ,
∣∣{w ∈ W˜ | ∃m ∈ M˜ c : w /∈ Bm
}∣∣. For every
0 ≤ nb ≤
⌊
nµ−nh
2
⌋
and for every l1, . . . , lnb > 0 s.t. l1 + · · · + lnb ≤ nµ − nh − nb, there exist
a profile PM of preference lists for M s.t. Bm(PM ) = Bm for each m ∈ M˜
c, and a matching µ s.t.
Wµ=W˜ andMµ=M˜ , s.t. both of the following hold.
1. There exists a profile PW of preference lists for W , in which Bw(PW )⊇Bw for each w ∈ W˜
c,
and in which W˜ have precisely nb nonempty blacklists, all pairwise disjoint and containing only
members of M˜ , and of sizes l1, . . . , lnb , s.t. the only stable matching, given PW and PM , is µ.
2. For every profile P ′W of preference lists for W s.t. the only stable matching, given P
′
W and PM ,
is µ, it holds that Bw(P
′
W ) ⊇ {m ∈ Bw(PW ) | w /∈ Bm} for each w ∈ W˜
c, and in addition,
there exist nb distinct women w1, . . . , wnb ∈ W˜ s.t. |Bw(P
′
W ) ∩ M˜ | ≥ li for every 0 ≤ i ≤ nb.
Remark 2. As in Remark 1, we note the following also regarding Theorem 7(2).
6A much weaker condition suffices. See e.g. Corollary 2(2) below.
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1. As shown in our proof below, the requirement that the only stable matching, given P ′W
and PM , is µ, may be replaced by the weaker assumption that the M -optimal stable
matching, given P ′W and PM , be µ.
2. No limitations are imposed regarding the number of blacklists in P ′W in which each man
appears; in particular, not even the blacklists of W˜ in P ′W need necessarily be pairwise
disjoint.
5 Divorces
In Section 4, we showed that women can force any (M -rational) matching as the outcome of
the Gale-Shapley algorithm, via a small amount of nonempty blacklists, and average blacklist
size less than one; nonetheless, as shown in that section, some of these blacklists may be quite
long, having length in the order of magnitude of the number of men. We now show that,
turning blacklisting into a dynamic process in the Gale-Shapley algorithm, women can force
any M -rational matching as the outcome by means of at most one blacklist-driven rejection
per woman (without averaging), but by a possibly-larger number of women than in Section 4.
Definition 8 (Gale-Shapley Algorithm with Divorces). We extend the Gale-Shapley algorithm
to allow for divorces as follows. The extended algorithm is divided into stages to which we
refer as seasons. In the first season, the vanilla (i.e. without divorces) Gale-Shapley algorithm
runs until it converges. At the end of each season s, if any woman asks to divorce her then-
current partner, then one of these women, denoted w, is chosen (arbitrarily, or according to
some predefined rule); in season s+1, the vanilla Gale-Shapley algorithm runs once more,
starting at the state concluding season s, with w rejecting her then-current partner on the first
night (e.g. on the second night, this partner serenades under the window of his next choice
after w), and running until it converges once more. When a season concludes with no woman
asking for a divorce, the Gale-Shapley algorithm with divorces concludes.
Remark 3. If all women have a divorce strategy of “never-divorce”, then the Gale-Shapley
algorithm with divorces concludes after one season, and is thus equivalent to the vanilla Gale-
Shapley algorithm.
We note that we define the Gale-Shapley algorithm with divorces in terms of seasons for
ease of presentation; indeed, all the results in this section hold verbatim, via conceptually-
similar proofs, if we allow every woman to divorce her partner instantaneously whenever she
so desires.
Before we present our results regarding divorces, we first exhibit the differences between
blacklists and divorces on one hand, and the similarities between these on the other hand.
To exhibit the qualitative distinction between these two concepts, consider for a moment a
woman w who wishes to blacklist all men who approach her on the first night of the vanilla
Gale-Shapley algorithm; such a (potentially-long) blacklist can be “replaced” by a single di-
vorce in the following manner: w places all such men at the end of her preference list in ar-
bitrary order, and thus rejects all such men but one of them, denoted m, on the first night;
if w does not reject m by the end of the season, then she asks to divorce him (possibly re-
peatedly, until she is chosen to do so).7 Indeed, as shown in Theorems 9 and 10, no woman
need divorce more than one man in order to achieve the lower bound on the required number
7We note that if men were allowed to divorce as well, then they could also use divorces to replace blacklists, but
to achieve a dual effect, i.e. instead of one divorce replacing the entire blacklist of one man, one divorce could allow
the blacklisting of a woman by a single one man instead of by a set of men. Indeed, consider e.g. the scenario in
which all men wish to blacklist all women, forcing the empty matching. In this case, the men could all set the same
order of preference for themselves; they would thus all serenade under the window of the same woman w on the
first night and w would thus reject all of them but a single man m, who would later divorce her. Similarly, every
woman would have to be divorced only by her most-favourite man, thus replacing blacklists with combined size
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of divorces; nonetheless, as we show in Theorem 10, the tight bound of Corollary 1 on the
combined size of all blacklists cannot be improved upon by replacing blacklists with divorces.
Proposition 8, which is an immediate consequence of the invariance of the outcome of the
vanilla Gale-Shapley algorithm under timing changes (Dubins and Freedman, 1981), exhibits
an equivalence, in a sense, of the strengths of blacklists and divorces.
Proposition 8 (Equivalent Strength of Divorces and Blacklists). LetW andM be equal-sized sets
of women and men, respectively, let PW be a profile of preference lists and divorce strategies forW and
let PM be a profile of preference lists forM . Let w ∈W .
1. If w’s divorce strategy in PW is that of “never-divorce”, then removing w’s blacklist, placing its
members in the end of w’s preference list in arbitrary order, and replacing w’s divorce strategy
with “always ask for a divorce if w’s current partner is in Bw(PW )”, does not alter the outcome
of the Gale-Shapley algorithm with divorces.
2. If w has an empty blacklist in PW , then replacing her divorce strategy with a “never-divorce”
strategy, and blacklisting the minimal set B s.t. B contains all the men w divorces during the
run of the Gale-Shapley algorithm with divorces given PW and PM and s.t. every man that w
rejects during this run in favour of a man in B is also in B,8 does not alter the outcome of the
Gale-Shapley algorithm with divorces.
We are now ready to formulate our results regarding the Gale-Shapley algorithm with di-
vorces.
Theorem 9 (One Divorce per Woman). Let W and M be equal-sized sets of women and men, re-
spectively. Define n, |W |= |M |. Let PM be a profile of preference lists for M . For every M -rational
perfect matching µ, there exist a profile PW of preference lists and divorce strategies forW , s.t. all of the
following hold.
1. The run of the Gale-Shapley algorithm with divorces according to PW and PM , which we hence-
forth denote by R, yields µ.
2. All blacklists in PW are empty.
3. At most n−1 divorces occur during R, each of them by a distinct woman. Moreover, if a season
of R commences with the divorce of a woman w, then this season concludes with w becoming
matched with µ(w).
Theorem 10 (Tightness of Theorem 9). Let n ∈ N and let W and M be sets of women and men,
respectively, s.t. |W |= |M |=n. There exist a profile PM of preference lists for M , and an M -rational
perfect matching µ, s.t. for every profile P ′W of preference lists and divorce strategies forW in which all
blacklists are empty s.t. the run of the Gale-Shapley algorithm with divorces, according to P ′W and PM ,
yields µ, at least n−1 divorces occur in this run.
Similarly to Theorems 6 and 7, it is possible to show that in the case of partial matchings,
no divorces (nor blacklists) are required by any woman who is not blacklisted by at least one
unmatched man. While any unmatched woman, in the context of Theorem 6, may be required
to blacklist as many as all men, in many cases when divorces are allowed, such blacklists of all
men can each be replaced by a single divorce.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4
LetW ,M and n be as in Theorem 4. We begin by defining some notation.
Definition 9. Let PW and PM be profiles of preferences lists forW and forM , respectively.
• We denote by RPW ,PM the run of the Gale-Shapley algorithm according to PW and PM ,
and denote the matching that RPW ,PM yields (i.e. theM -optimal stable matching for PW
and PM ) byMenOpt(PW ,PM ).
• Let µ′ be a matching. We denote by RPW ,PMµ′ the run of the Gale-Shapley algorithm ac-
cording to PW and PM , starting with µ
′ as the initial state, and denote the matching that
RPW ,PMµ′ yields by µ
′
PW ,PM
.
At the heart of our proof of Theorem 4 lies a combinatorial structure that we call a cycle,
and which we now define.
Definition 10.
1. (w1
m1−−→ w2
m2−−→ · · ·wd−1
md−1
−−−→ wd), for d ∈ N, is called a cycle if for every i < d, wi ∈ W
andmi ∈M , and if wd = w1.
2. We say that a cycle C , (w1
m1−−→ w2
m2−−→ · · ·wd−1
md−1
−−−→ wd) is simple if w1, . . . , wd−1,
m1, . . . ,md−1 are all distinct, i.e. if the only participant appearing in C more than once is
w1, appearing both as w1 and as wd.
3. We say that two cycles C, C˜ are are disjoint if no participant appears in both.
4. We say that a cycle C˜ is a cyclic shift of a cycle C , (w1
m1−−→ w2
m2−−→ · · ·wd−1
md−1
−−−→ wd) if
there exists 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ d s.t. C˜ = (wℓ
mℓ−−→ wℓ+1 · · ·
md−1
−−−→ wd = w1
m1−−→ w2
m2−−→ · · ·wℓ).
Cycles can be used to naturally describe the dynamics following a rejection in the Gale-
Shapley algorithm, as we now show.
Definition 11. Let µ′ be a matching. We say that profiles PW and PM of preferences lists for
W andM , respectively, are µ′-cycle generating if all of the following hold.
1. For everym ∈M , there exists a woman wm s.t. all of the following hold.
i. m is wm’s top choice.
ii. m does not blacklist wm.
iii. m weakly prefers µ′(m) over wm.
2. There exists a unique woman w˜ ∈W s.t. w˜ blacklists µ′(w˜). We call w˜ the cycle trigger.
Lemma 1. Let µ′ be a matching. For every µ′-cycle-generating profiles PW and PM of preferences lists
forW andM , respectively, all ofW andM are matched according to µ′
PW ,PM
.
Proof. As |W | = |M |, it is enough to show that everym ∈M is matched according to µ′
PW ,PM
.
Assume for contradiction thatm ∈M is unmatched according to µ′
PW ,PM
. As wm is not black-
listed by m, and as m weakly prefers µ′(m) over wm, we have, by m being unmatched in
µ′
PW ,PM
, that m serenades under wm’s window during R
PW ,PM
µ′ , and that wm rejects w during
this run; butm is wm’s top choice — a contradiction.
Definition 12. Let µ′ be a matching. Let PW and PM be µ
′-cycle-generating profiles of pref-
erences lists for W and M , respectively, with cycle trigger w˜. We define the rejection cycle
(PW ,PM )-generated from µ
′, denoted by CPW ,PMµ′ , as (w1
m1−−→ w2
m2−−→ · · ·wd−1
md−1
−−−→ wd), where
d, (wi)
d
i=1 and (mi)
d
i=1 are defined by following R
PW ,PM
µ′ :
1. w1 = w˜,m1 = µ
′(w˜). (w1 rejectsm1 on the first night.)
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2. On the nights following the rejection ofmi by wi,mi serenades under the windows of the
women following wi in his preferences list. Denote the first of these women to provision-
ally accept him by wi+1. If wi+1 does not reject any man on the night on which she first
provisionally accepted mi, then denote d = i + 1 and the algorithm stops. Otherwise,
denote the unique man rejected by wi+1 on that night bymi+1.
Lemma 2. Under the conditions of Definition 12, CPW ,PMµ′ is a well-defined cycle.
Proof. We show by induction that on every night of the algorithm, one of the following holds:
(The claim follows directly from this proof.)
1. Each man serenades under a distinct woman’s window. In this case, either the algorithm
stops or only w˜ rejects the man serenading under her window.
2. No man serenades under w˜’s window, two men serenade under the window of some
other woman w, and each other woman is serenaded-to by one man. In this case, one of
the men serenading under w’s window is the only man rejected on this night.
Base: By definition, on the first night each man m ∈ M serenades under µ′(m)’s window,
and all of these women are distinct. By definition of w˜, indeed the only rejection on the first
night is ofm1 by w1. Therefore, the first night is of Type 1.
Step: Assume that the algorithm does not stop at the end of the i’th night. Regardless of
the type of the i’th night, by the induction hypothesis exactly one man m is rejected during it,
while n− 1men are provisionally accepted during it, each by a distinct woman fromW \ {w˜}.
By Lemma 1, on the i + 1’th night m serenades under some woman w’s window. If w = w˜,
we show that the i + 1’th night is of Type 1. Indeed, in this case each woman is serenaded-to
by exactly one man. Furthermore, each women w′ ∈ W \ {w˜} is serenaded-to by the man she
provisionally accepts on the i’th night; therefore, this man is not in w′’s blacklist, and being the
only man serenading under w′’s window on the i+ 1’th night, he is not rejected on this night.
Thus, no man but m is rejected the i + 1’th night. If m is not rejected on this night, then the
algorithm stops; otherwise, m is rejected by the woman under whose window he serenades,
that is, by w˜.
Otherwise, w 6= w˜ and in this case we show that the i + 1’th night is of Type 2. Indeed, in
this case, on the i+ 1’th night no one serenades under w˜’s window, two men serenades under
w’s window (m and the man w provisionally accepts on the i’th night, denoted henceforth as
m′), and each womanW \{w˜, w} is serenaded-to by exactly one man. Similarly to the previous
case, eachwomen inW \{w, w˜} is serenaded-to by theman she provisionally accepts on the i’th
night; therefore, this man is not in this woman’s blacklist, and being the only man serenading
under her window on the i+1’th night, he is not rejected on this night. Thus, no woman but w
rejects any man during this night. Asm′ is provisionally accepted by w on the i’th night, he is
not blacklisted by her, and thus she does not reject both m and m′ on the i + 1’th night. Thus,
she rejects exactly one of them on this night and the proof is complete.
Lemma 3. Under the conditions of Definition 12, the participants for whom µ′
PW ,PM
(p) 6= µ′(p) are
exactly the participants in CPW ,PMµ′ .
Proof. By Definition 12, the participants in µ′
PW ,PM
(p) are exactly the participants who reject or
are rejected during RPW ,PMµ′ .
We now move on to define, given two matchings, a cycle associated with both. While this
definition is syntactic, and a priori not related to any run, in Lemmas 7 and 8 we show its
relation to Definition 12.
Definition 13. Let µ′ and µ be two matchings and let w ∈ W . We define a sequence Sµµ′(w) ,(
(wi,mi)
)∞
i=1
∈ (W ×M)N as follows:
1. w1 = w.
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2. mi = µ
′(wi).
3. wi+1 = µ(mi).
Let d > 1 be minimal s.t. wd = w1. If d > 2, then we define the (µ
′ → µ)-cycle of w, denoted
by Cµµ′(w), as (w1
m1−−→ w2
m2−−→ · · ·wd−1
md−1
−−−→ wd). Otherwise (i.e. if µ(w) = µ
′(w)), we define
Cµµ′(w) = (w).
Lemma 4.
1. Cµµ′(w) is a well-defined simple cycle, for every w ∈W .
2. For every w,w′ ∈W , Cµµ′(w) and C
µ
µ′(w
′) are either disjoint, or cyclic shifts of one another.
3. W is partitioned into (the women from) (µ′ → µ)-cycles.
Proof. Let w ∈ W and denote
(
(wn,mn)
)∞
i=1
, Sµµ′(w). By definitions of µ and µ
′, for each i,
wi uniquely determinesmi and (if i 6= 1) wi−1; similarly, mi uniquely determines wi and wi+1.
Thus, Sµµ′(w) is periodic, and a single period of this sequence contains no participant more than
once; therefore, Part 1 follows. We furthermore conclude that for every w,w′ ∈ W , Sµµ′(w) and
Sµµ′(w
′) are either disjoint, or each a suffix of the other, and thus Part 2 follows. Finally, Part 3
is an immediate consequence of Part 2.
Remark 4. There is is a natural isomorphisms between (µ′ → µ)-cycles modulo cyclic shifts,
and cycles of the permutation µ ◦ µ′−1 (resp. of the permutation µ′ ◦ µ−1), given by taking all
women (resp. all men; or µ(w), if d = 1) of a (µ′ → µ)-cycle in order.
Our proof strategy for Theorem 4, as seen below, is to iteratively modify the preferences of
W , so that theM -optimal matching they yield becomes “closer and closer”, in a sense, to the
target matching µ. We now define the property required of these intermediate M -optimal
matchings µ′ w.r.t. the preferences of M , for this process to be able to continue until µ is
achieved.
Definition 14. Let µ′ and µ be matchings. We say that a profile of preference lists for M is
(µ′ → µ)-compatible ifm ∈M weakly prefers µ′(m) over µ(m), but does not blacklist µ(m).
Lemma 5. Let µ′ and µ be matchings and let PM be an (µ
′ → µ)-compatible profile of preference lists
forM . For every profile PW of preference lists forW according to which each woman w’s top choice is
µ(w), all ofW andM are matched according to µ′
PW ,PM
, and PM is also (µ
′
PW ,PM
→ µ)-compatible.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. Let m ∈ M . We need only show that m is
matched in µ′
PW ,PM
(m) and weakly prefers µ′
PW ,PM
(m) over µ(m). Since m weakly prefers
µ′(m) over µ(m), whom he does not blacklist, we have that m would serenade under µ(m)’s
window during RPW ,PMµ′ before serenading under the window of any woman he prefers less,
and before becoming unmatched. As µ(m)’s top choice is m, she would never reject him, and
the proof is complete.
We now begin the journey toward developing Lemma 9, which is the main technical tool
underlying our proof of Theorem 4. Lemma 9 is proven inductively, by continuously tweaking
the preferences of W until they meet a certain property. Definition 15 defines the induction-
invariant properties of the preferences ofW during this process, while Lemmas 7 and 8 define
the induction base and step of this process, respectively.
Definition 15. Let µ′ and µ be matchings and let PM be an (µ
′ → µ)-compatible profile of pref-
erence lists forM . We say that a profile PW of preference lists forW is (µ
′ PM−−→ µ)-compatible if
all the following hold.
1. PW and PM are µ
′-cycle generating.
2. Each woman w’s top choice is µ(w).
3. The cycle trigger for CPW ,PMµ′ blacklists (at least) everym ∈M s.t. µ
′
PW ,PM
(m) 6= µ(m).
16
4. For every woman w other than the cycle trigger, everym ∈M that w prefers over µ′(w),
except perhaps for µ(w), satisfies µ′
PW ,PM
(m) = µ(m).
5. For every w ∈W , µ′
PW ,PM
(w) ∈
{
µ′(w), µ(w)
}
.
Lemma 6. Under the conditions of Definition 15, all of the following hold.
1. Letm ∈M s.t. µ′
PW ,PM
(m) 6= µ(m). The only w ∈W who prefers m over µ′(w) is µ(m).
2. For every p ∈W ∪M , µ′
PW ,PM
(p) ∈
{
µ′(p), µ(p)
}
.
3. µ′
PW ,PM
(p) = µ(p) 6= µ′(p) for every participant p in CPW ,PMµ′ .
4.
{
p ∈W ∪M | µ′
PW ,PM
(p) = µ(p)
}
is a (disjoint) union of (µ′ → µ)-cycles.
Proof.
1. Follows from Definition 15(4).
2. Follows from Definition 15(5).
3. By Lemma 3, every participant p in CPW ,PMµ′ satisfies µ
′
PW ,PM
(p) 6= µ′(p). Thus, by Part 2,
we also have µ′
PW ,PM
(p) = µ(p).
4. Let w be a woman s.t. µ′
PW ,PM
(w) = µ(w). If µ′(w) = µ(w), then Cµµ′(w) = (w). Other-
wise, denote Cµµ′(w) = (w1
m1−−→ w2
m2−−→ · · ·wd−1
md−1
−−−→ wd), and we show by induction
that for all participants p in Cµµ′(w), µ
′
PW ,PM
(p) = µ(p) 6= µ′(p).
Base: By definition, w1 = w, and thus µ
′
PW ,PM
(w1) = µ(w1) and by assumption, µ(w1) 6=
µ′(w1).
Step 1: Assume that µ′
PW ,PM
(wi) = µ(wi) 6= µ
′(wi) for some 1 ≤ i < d. Recall that
mi = µ
′(wi). Since mi = µ
′(wi) 6= µ(wi), we have µ
′(mi) = wi 6= µ(mi). Since mi =
µ′(wi) 6= µ
′
PW ,PM
(wi), we have wi = µ
′(mi) 6= µ
′
PW ,PM
(mi). Thus, by Definition 15(5),
µ′
PW ,PM
(mi) = µ(mi).
Step 2: Assume that µ′
PW ,PM
(mi) = µ(mi) 6= µ
′(mi) for some 1 ≤ i < d. Recall
that wi+1 = µ(mi). Since wi+1 = µ(mi) = µ
′
PW ,PM
(mi), we have µ(wi+1) = mi =
µ′
PW ,PM
(wi+1). Since wi+1 = µ(mi) 6= µ
′(mi), we have µ(wi+1) = mi 6= µ
′(wi+1).
The proof that for everym ∈ M s.t. µ′
PW ,PM
(m) = µ(m) 6= µ′(m), we have µ′
PW ,PM
(p) =
µ(p) 6= µ′(p) for all participants p in Cµµ′(µ(m)) (this cycle includesm asmd−1), uses Step
2 as the induction base and Steps 1 and 2 as the induction steps.
Lemma 7. Let µ′ and µ be matchings, let w˜ ∈ W s.t. µ(w˜) 6= µ′(w˜), and let PW be a profile of
preference lists for W according to which each woman w 6= w˜ has preference list starting with µ(w),
followed immediately by µ′(w) (if µ′(w) 6= µ(w)), followed by some or all other men in arbitrary order,
and in which w˜ has preference list µ(w˜), with all other men blacklisted. For every (µ′ → µ)-compatible
profile PM of preference lists forM , both of the following hold.
1. PW is (µ
′ PM−−→ µ)-compatible.
2. CPW ,PMµ′ = C
µ
µ′(w˜).
Proof. It is straightforward to check, immediately from the definition of PW , that PW and PM
are µ′-cycle generating with cycle trigger w˜ and with wm = µ(m) for every m ∈ M . Thus, in
particular Part 1 of Definition 15 holds. By definition of PW , we trivially have that Part 2 of
Definition 15 holds.
By Lemma 1 and by definition of PW , we have µ
′
PW ,PM
(w˜) = µ(w˜). Thus, µ′
PW ,PM
(µ(w˜)) =
µ(µ(w˜)), and so, by definition of PW we have that w˜ blacklists everym ∈M s.t. µ
′
PW ,PM
(m) 6=
µ(m) and Part 3 of Definition 15 holds.
Let w ∈ W \ {w˜}. By definition of PW , the only man that w possibly prefers over µ
′(w) is
µ(w) (and this only happens if µ(w) 6= µ′(w)), and thus Part 4 of Definition 15 vacuously holds.
For every woman w ∈ W , by a well-known property of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, we
have that µ′
PW ,PM
(w) is w’s most-preferred choice out of all the men that serenade under her
window during RPW ,PMµ′ . Thus, since on the first night of this run, each woman w ∈ W \ {w˜}
17
is serenaded-to by µ′(w), she weakly prefers µ′
PW ,PM
(w) over µ′(w); therefore, by definition
of PW , we obtain that µ
′
PW ,PM
(w) ∈ {µ′(w), µ(w)} for every w ∈ W \ {w˜}. Recall that
µ′
PW ,PM
(w˜) = µ(w˜). By both of these, Part 5 of Definition 15 holds and the proof of Part 1
is complete.
We now prove Part 2. Define CPW ,PMµ′ = (w1
m1−−→ w2
m2−−→ · · ·wd−1
md−1
−−−→ wd). We show by
induction that (w1
m1−−→ w2
m2−−→ · · ·wd−1
md−1
−−−→ wd) = C
µ
µ′(w˜).
Base: As w˜ is the cycle trigger for CPW ,PMµ′ , we have, by Definition 12 that w1 = w˜ and
m1 = µ
′(w˜), agreeing with the definition of Cµµ′(w˜).
Step: Let 1 < i ≤ d and assume that wj and mj agree with the definition of C
µ
µ′(w˜) for
every j ≤ i. We show that wi and, if i < d, also mi, agrees with the definition of C
µ
µ′(w˜) as
well. Let t be the night on which wi rejects mi. On the first night, every w ∈ W \ {w˜} is
serenaded-to by µ′(w), whom she does not blacklist; therefore, once more by the same well-
known property of the Gale-Shapley algorithm as above, on every night there is a man sere-
nading underw’s window that she weakly prefers over µ′(w). Thus, by definition ofPW , every
w ∈ W \ {w˜, µ(mi), µ
′(mi)} is serenaded-to on every night by a man she strictly prefers over
mi, and would thus rejectmi if he ever serenaded under w’s window. Furthermore, as, by the
induction hypothesis,wi = µ
′(mi) rejectsmi on night t, we have that he does not serenade un-
der her window on any later night. Thus, wi+1 ∈ {w˜, µ(mi)}. If w˜ = µ(mi), then wi+1 = w˜ and
by definition of PW , she does not blacklist mi. Thus, the algorithm stops, yielding d = i + 1.
Thus,wi+1 and d agree with the definition of C
µ
µ′(w˜). Otherwise, w˜ 6= µ(mi) , and thus, by defi-
nition of PW , w˜ blacklists w, and thus wi+1 6= w˜, and we have wi+1 = µ(mi). Let t
′ be the night
on which mi serenades under wi+1’s window for the first time. By the induction hypothesis
and by Lemma 4(1), we have that wi+1 has yet to reject anyone by night t, and thus by night
t′ − 1, and thus on night t′ she rejects the man serenading under her window continuously
from the first night, namely µ′(wi+1), and thus mi+1 = µ
′(wi+1) and the proof by induction is
complete.
Corollary 3. Under the conditions of Lemma 7, µ′
P˜W ,PM
(w) = µ(w) for all women w in Cµµ′(w˜) (and
thus in particular also for w = w˜), as well as for all w for whom µ′(w) = µ(w).
Proof. By the proof of Lemma 7, or immediately by Lemma 6(3) and by Definition 15(5).
Lemma 8. Let µ′ and µ be matchings and let PM be a (µ
′ → µ)-compatible profile of preference lists for
M . Let PW be a (µ
′ PM−−→ µ)-compatible profile of preference lists forW . Let w˜ ∈ W be a woman who
rejects a man m˜ during RPW ,PMµ′ , but s.t. µ
′
PW ,PM
(w˜) 6= µ(w˜). Let P˜W be a profile of preference lists
forW , obtained from PW by modifying the preference list of w˜ to start with µ(w˜), followed immediately
by m˜, followed immediately by µ′(w˜), followed by some or all other men in arbitrary order. P˜W satisfies
both of the following.
1. P˜W is (µ
′ PM−−→ µ)-compatible.
2. CP˜W ,PMµ′ = (w1
m1−−→ w2 · · ·
mℓ−1
−−−→ wℓ
mℓ−−→ Cµµ′(w˜)
mℓ−−→ wℓ+1
mℓ+1
−−−→ wℓ+2
mℓ+2
−−−→ · · ·wd), where
(w1
m1−−→ w2
m2−−→ · · ·wd−1
md−1
−−−→ wd) , C
PW ,PM
µ′ and where mℓ = m˜ is rejected by w˜ during
RPW ,PMµ′ between his rejection by wℓ and his provisional acceptance by wℓ+1.
Proof. It is straightforward to check, immediately from the definition of P˜W , that since PW and
PM are µ
′-cycle generating, so are P˜W and PM (and with the same cycle trigger and wm’s).
Before continuing to prove Part 1, we now prove Part 2.
By Lemma 6(3), w˜ /∈ {wi}
d
i=1; thus, w˜ rejects m˜ during R
PW ,PM
µ′ “on his way” between two
women wℓ and wℓ+1 for some ℓ, and thusmℓ = m˜. As m˜ does not serenade under w˜’s window
after she rejects him, ℓ is well-defined. We note that by definition of P˜W , R
P˜W ,PM
µ′ and R
PW ,PM
µ′
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coincide as long as m˜ does not does serenade under w˜’s window, and thus CP˜W ,PMµ′ has prefix
(w1
m1−−→ w2 · · ·
mℓ−1
−−−→ wℓ
mℓ−−→.
By Lemma 6(4), and by Lemma 4(2), we have that for every m in Cµµ′(w˜), m is not in
CPW ,PMµ′ ; thus, such m is never rejected during R
PW ,PM
µ′ , and thus serenades throughout all
nights of RPW ,PMµ′ under the window of the same woman — the one under whose window m
serenades on the first night of RPW ,PMµ′ , namely µ
′(m), by definition.
We now show by induction that CP˜W ,PMµ′ has prefix (w1
m1−−→ w2 · · ·
mℓ−1
−−−→ wℓ
mℓ−−→ Cµµ′(w˜).
Denote Cµµ′(w˜) = (w
′
1
m′1−−→ w′2
m′2−−→ · · ·w′d′−1
m′
d′−1
−−−−→ w′d′).
Base: As explained above, up to the night on which m˜ serenades under w˜’s window, we
have that CP˜W ,PMµ′ has prefix (w1
m1−−→ w2 · · ·
mℓ−1
−−−→ wℓ
mℓ−−→. As explained above, the other man
serenading under w˜’s window on that night is µ′(w˜), and by definition of P˜W , she thus rejects
him in favour of m˜ during that night of RP˜W ,PMµ′ . Thus, the next woman in C
P˜W ,PM
µ′ is w˜ = w
′
1,
and the next man — m˜ = m′1.
Step: Let 1 < i ≤ d′ and assume that we have shown that CP˜W ,PMµ′ has prefix (w1
m1−−→
w2 · · ·
mℓ−1
−−−→ wℓ
mℓ−−→ w′1
m′1−−→ · · ·w′i
m′i−−→. As explained above, we have µ′
PW ,PM
(m′i) 6= µ(m
′
i), and
thus, by Definition 15(3) (since w1 6= w˜), we have that m
′
i is blacklisted by w1. Thus, the next
woman inCP˜W ,PMµ′ is notw1. Once more by the samewell-known property of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm as above, on every night each woman w ∈ W \ {w1} is serenaded-to by a man she
weakly prefers over µ′(w). Thus, by Lemma 6(1), and by Lemma 1, we have that the next
woman in CP˜W ,PMµ′ is µ(m
′
i) = w
′
i+1. If i = d, the proof by induction is complete. Otherwise, let
t be the night on which m′i first serenades under w
′
i+1’s window during R
P˜W ,PM
µ′ . As m
′
i+1 =
µ′(w′i+1) is not in C
PW ,PM
µ′ and by Lemma 4(1), we have thatm
′
i+1 has not been rejected before
night t, and thus he is the other man (in addition to m′i) serenading under µ
′(wi+1)’s window
on night t. Therefore, by Definition 15(2) (and since w′i+1 6= w˜, by Lemma 4(1)), the next man
in CP˜W ,PMµ′ ism
′
i+1, and the proof by induction is complete.
Denote by t the night on which m˜ first serenades under w˜’s window and by t′ — the night
on which m′d′−1 first serenades under her window. As C
PW ,PM
µ′ and C
µ
µ′(w˜) are disjoint, and
as m˜ = mℓ is in C
PW ,PM
µ′ , it follows that m˜ is not rejected between nights t and t
′, exclusive of
t′. Thus, and as w′d′ = w
′
1 = w˜ provisionally accepts m˜ at time t, it follows that he is the man
rejected by w′d′ in favour ofm
′
d′−1 during R
P˜W ,PM
µ′ .
So far, we have that CP˜W ,PMµ′ has prefix (w1
m1−−→ w2 · · ·
mℓ−1
−−−→ wℓ
mℓ−−→ Cµµ′(w˜)
mℓ−−→. We
conclude the proof inductively.
Assume that for some ℓ ≤ i < d, CP˜W ,PMµ′ has prefix (w1
m1−−→ w2 · · ·
mℓ−1
−−−→ wℓ
mℓ−−→
Cµµ′(w˜)
mℓ−−→ wℓ
mℓ+1
−−−→ · · ·wi
mi−−→.
If i = ℓ, denote r = w˜ = w′d′ ; otherwise, denote r = wi. Let t be the night on which r rejects
mi during R
PW ,PM
µ′ and let t
′ be the night on which r rejects mi during R
P˜W ,PM
µ′ . In order to
show that the next woman in CP˜W ,PMµ′ is wi+1, we have to show that on night t
′ in RP˜W ,PMµ′ ,
every woman that mi prefers over wi+1 but less than r, prefers her provisional match over
mi, while wi+1 prefers mi over her provisional match. Let w ∈ W s.t. mi prefers r over w and
weakly prefersw overwi+1. Ifw is inC
µ
µ′(w˜), then asC
µ
µ′(w˜) andC
PW ,PM
µ′ are distinct,w 6= wi+1.
Furthermore, as w is in Cµµ′(w˜), then by the induction hypothesis she is provisionally matched
on some night before night t′ inRP˜W ,PMµ′ with µ(w), and by Definition 15(2) and by definition of
P˜W prefers him over any otherman (includingmi), and is thus, in particular, also provisionally
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matched with µ(w) on night t′. Otherwise, w is not in Cµµ′(w˜) and thus in particular w 6= w˜.
As w 6= w˜, she has the same preferences according to P˜W as she does according to PW , and in
particular mi serenades under w’s window “on his way” to wi+1 (inclusive) during R
PW ,PM
µ′ ,
and thus it is enough to show that she has the same provisional match on night t in RPW ,PMµ′
as she does on night t′ in RP˜W ,PMµ′ . Indeed, if there does not exists j < i s.t. w = wj , then by
the induction hypothesis this provisional match on both nights is µ′(w); otherwise, let j < i be
maximal s.t. w = wj — if j > 1 then this provisional match on both nights in both runs ismj−1
and otherwise she is not provisionally matched to anyone in either night in either run. Thus,
we conclude that the next woman in CP˜W ,PMµ′ is indeed wi+1.
If wi+1 = w˜, then both R
PW ,PM
µ′ and R
P˜W ,PM
µ′ stop, and thus i + 1 = d and the proof is
complete; assume, therefore, that wi+1 6= w˜. Recall that C
µ
µ′(w˜) and C
PW ,PM
µ′ are disjoint; thus,
wi+1 is not in C
µ
µ′(w˜) and therefore, as explained above, her provisional match in R
P˜W ,PM
µ′ at
night t′ is the same as in RPW ,PMµ′ at night t, namely mi+1, and thus he is the next man in
CP˜W ,PMµ′ and the proof by induction is complete.
We now turn to finish proving Part 1. Part 2 of Definition 15 holds for P˜W since it holds for
PW and by definition of P˜W .
To show that Parts 3 to 5 of Definition 15 hold, it is enough to show that for every man
m ∈ M s.t. µ′
P˜W ,PM
(m) 6= µ′
PW ,PM
(m), we have µ′
P˜W ,PM
(m) = µ(m). (To deduce Part 4 of
Definition 15, we note that µ′
P˜W ,PM
(m˜) = µ(m), as seen above.) Letm ∈M . Ifm is in CPW ,PMµ′ ,
then let i be maximal s.t.mi = m. As explained above, µ
′
P˜W ,PM
(m) = wi = µ
′
PW ,PM
(m). (And
by Lemma 6(3), µ′
PW ,PM
(m) = µ(m) anyway.) Otherwise, if m is in CP˜W ,PMµ′ , then m is in
Cµµ′(w˜), and as shown above, µ
′
P˜W ,PM
(m) = µ(m). Finally, ifm is not in CP˜W ,PMµ′ , thenm is not
in CPW ,PMµ′ either, and by Lemma 3, we have µ
′
P˜W ,PM
(m) = µ′(m) = µ′
PW ,PM
(m) and the proof
is complete.
Corollary 4. Under the conditions of Lemma 8, µ′
P˜W ,PM
(w) = µ(w) for all women w in Cµµ′(w˜) (and
thus in particular also for w = w˜), as well as for all w for whom µ′
PW ,PM
(w) = µ(w).
Proof. By the proof of Lemma 8, or immediately by Lemma 6(3) and by Definition 15(5).
We are now ready to define the inductive result stemming from Lemma 7 as the induction
base and from Lemma 8 as the induction step.
Lemma 9. Let µ′ and µ be matchings, let PM be a (µ
′ → µ)-compatible profile of preference lists for
M and let PW be a profile of preference lists for W according to which each w ∈ W has preference list
starting with µ(w), followed immediately by µ′(w) (if µ′(w) 6= µ(w)), followed by some or all other
men in arbitrary order. For every w˜ ∈W s.t. µ(w˜) 6= µ′(w˜), there exists a profile P˜W of preference lists
forW s.t. all of the following hold.
1. µ′
P˜W ,PM
(w˜) = µ(w˜), and w˜ still has µ(w˜) at the top of her preference list, followed only by men
who do not serenade under w˜’s window during RP˜W ,PMµ′ .
2. Every w ∈ W \ {w˜} whose preference lists according to PW and to P˜W differ satisfies all of the
following.
i. w still has µ(w) at the top of her preference list.
ii. The difference in w’s preference list is only in the promotion of a man m who strictly prefer
µ′(m) over w.
iii. µ′
P˜W ,PM
(w) = µ(w) 6= µ′(w)
3.
{
w ∈W | µ′(w) = µ(w)
}
(
{
w ∈W | µ′
P˜W ,PM
(w) = µ(w)
}
.
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4. Every w ∈W who rejects any man during RP˜W ,PMµ′ satisfies µ
′
P˜W ,PM
(w) = µ(w).
5. No woman’s blacklist differs between PW and P˜W , except perhaps for that of w˜, each of the men
m she blacklists according to P˜W satisfying µ
′
P˜W ,PM
(m) = µ(m) 6= µ′(m).
Proof. Let P˜W be the profile of preferences obtained by PW by modifying the preference list
of w˜ to consist solely of µ(w˜), with all other men blacklisted. By Lemma 7, P˜W is (µ
′ PM−−→ µ)-
compatible. As long as there exits a woman w ∈ W who rejects a man during RP˜W ,PMµ′ but
s.t. µ′
P˜W ,PM
(w) 6= µ(w), we may modify P˜W using Lemma 8 (without modifying w’s black-
list), keeping it (µ′
PM−−→ µ)-compatible and only enlarging CP˜W ,PMµ′ . We thus repeatedly apply
Lemma 8 to modify P˜W until no such woman exists. We note that this process stops after
at most
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
applications of Lemma 8, as by Corollary 4 the number of women w ∈ W for
whom µ′
P˜W ,PM
(w) = µ(w) increases by at least 2 following each application of Lemma 8 (and
by Corollary 3 equals at least 2 immediately after applying Lemma 7). Finally, we shorten the
blacklist of w˜ in P˜W to contain only the men that she actually rejects during R
P˜W ,PM
µ′ (R
P˜W ,PM
µ′
is thus completely unaffected by this).
By Corollaries 3 and 4, we have that that Parts 1 and 3 hold. (The second part of Part 1
follows from the final stage of the construction of P˜W .) We now show that Part 2 holds. Let
w ∈ W \ {w˜} whose preference list differs between PW and P˜W . By our construction, w’s
preference list was changed by an application of Lemma 8 with w in the role of w˜ (as defined
there), and therefore µ′(w) 6= µ(w), and by Corollary 4, also µ′
P˜W ,PM
(w) = µ(w). Furthermore,
the change of w’s preference list is in the promotion to second place of a man m˜ who, by
Lemma 8(2), serenades under w’s window during RP˜W ,PMµ′ following his rejection by another
woman; thus, m˜ strictly prefers µ′(m), under whose window he serenades on the first night of
RP˜W ,PMµ′ , over w, as required.
Part 4 follows by construction, as it was no longer possible to apply Lemma 8 when the
construction stopped.
It thus remains to prove Part 5. By construction, the only blacklist that was changed during
construction of P˜W from PW is indeed that of w˜. Furthermore, by the last step of the construc-
tion, every man blacklisted by w˜ is rejected by her duringRP˜W ,PMµ′ . Thus, every such man is in
CP˜W ,PMµ′ and by Lemma 6(3) the proof is complete.
Corollary 5. Under the conditions of Lemma 9, denote the size of w˜’s blacklist, according to P˜W , by b.
At least b+ 1 menm satisfy µ′
P˜W ,PM
(m) = µ(m) 6= µ′(m).
Proof. By Lemma 9(5), all b distinct men in w˜’s blacklist (according to P˜W ) satisfy the required
condition. Furthermore, by definition of w˜ and by Lemma 9(1), we have that µ′
P˜W ,PM
(w˜) =
µ(w˜) 6= µ′(w˜), and thus µ′
P˜W ,PM
(w˜), who is by definition not blacklisted by w˜ and is thus
distinct from the bmen in her blacklist, satisfies the required condition as well.
While a considerable amount of reasoning went into proving Lemma 9 (and the lemmas
supporting it), and while PW is constructed in its proof via an inductive process naı¨vely re-
quiring a simulation of a run of the Gale-Shapley algorithm on every iteration, we now show
that PW can be calculated quite efficiently, by leveraging the theory of cycles developed above.
Indeed, without the aid of this theory, Algorithm 1 may seem quite obscure.
Lemma 10. P˜W from Lemma 9 can be computed in O(n · k) time, where k is the number of men m
(alternatively, women) satisfying µ′
P˜W ,PM
(m) = µ(m) 6= µ′(m).
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Proof. Algorithm 1 computes P˜W , as it is equivalent to the construction of Lemma 9, each time
applying Lemma 8 to the woman who performs the earliest rejection out of the women w for
who are not eventually-matched with µ(w).
Algorithm 1 In-place computation of P˜W from Lemma 9, using O(n) additional memory, in
O(n · k) time. (All lines run in O(1) time, unless otherwise noted.)
1: // See Algorithm 2 for the reason for separation of the initialization.
2: procedure INITIALIZE(µ′ , µ)
3: // Initialize todo.
4: todo ←
{
w ∈W | µ′(w) 6= µ(w)
}
// implemented as hash set; O(n)
5: end procedure
6: procedure COMPUTELEMMA9(µ′ , µ,PM , w˜, P˜W ) // P˜W = PW when called
7: // Initialize RP˜W ,PMµ′ simulation.
8: provisionalMatching ← µ′ // O(n)
9: shouldBlacklist ← empty hash set // the men to be blacklisted by w˜
10: currentPref ← array indexed byM // cache, initialized in lines 18 and 42
11: // Initialize P˜W as in Lemma 7.
12: set preference list of w˜ in P˜W to
(
µ(w˜)
)
// not required for correctness
13: // Simulate RP˜W ,PMµ′ , adjusting P˜W as needed.
14: insertm into shouldBlacklist
15: provisionalMatching [w˜]← ∅ // instead ofm; not required for correctness
16: m← µ′(w˜) // m is the man currently “on the move”
17: MARKASDONECYCLEOF(w˜) // see line 53
18: currentPref [m]← pointer tom’s preference list right after w˜ // O(n)
19: whilem 6= µ(w˜) or deref currentPref [m] 6= w˜ do // < k · (n− 1) iterations
20: // Loop Invariant:
21: // todo =
{
w ∈W | µ′
P˜W ,PM
(w) 6= µ(w)
}
.
22: w ← deref currentPref [m] // the woman currently approached bym
23: advance currentPref [m]
24: let provisionallyAccept be a boolean // should w provisionally acceptm?
25: if w = w˜ then // by the loop condition,m 6= µ(w˜)
26: insertm into shouldBlacklist
27: provisionallyAccept ← false
28: else ifm = µ(w) then
29: provisionallyAccept ← true
30: discard currentPref [m]
31: else if w ∈ todo then // ≤
⌊
k−1
2
⌋
times throughout the run
32: // Update P˜W as in Lemma 8.
33: promotem to be second on w’s preference list in P˜W // O(n)
34: MARKASDONECYCLEOF(w) // see line 53
35: provisionallyAccept ← true
36: else
37: provisionallyAccept ← false
38: end if
39: if provisionallyAccept then
40: swap values ofm and provisionalMatching [w]
41: if undefined currentPref [m] then // < k times throughout the run
42: currentPref [m]← pointer tom’s preference list right after w // O(n)
43: end if
44: end if // else, do not provisionally accept (i.e. m is rejected by w)
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45: end while
46: provisionalMatching [w˜]← m
47: // Update w˜’s blacklist per the final step of the construction from Lemma 9.
48: set w˜’s blacklist to be shouldBlacklist (keeping µ(w˜) most-preferred) // O(n)
49: // At this point, provisionalMatching = µ′
P˜W ,PM
.
50: return provisionalMatching
51: end procedure
52: // Removes all women in Cµµ′(w) from todo .
53: procedureMARKASDONECYCLEOF(w)
54: w′ ← w
55: repeat // ≤ n iterations throughout the run of COMPUTELEMMA9
56: remove w′ from todo
57: w′ ← µ(µ′(w′));
58: until w′ = w
59: end procedure
We note that as there are at most k rejected men (by Lemma 6(3)), each newly-serenading at
most n− 1 times, the loop starting at line 19 indeed iterates less than k · (n− 1) times.
Before proving Theorem 4, we first prove a simpler special case thereof, in which each man
approaches a distinct woman on the first night, e.g. as in Example 1. (We reference and reuse
significant portions of this proof in the more-intricate proof of the general case of Theorem 4
below.)
Theorem 11. Theorem 4 holds for the special case in which each man approaches a distinct woman on
the first night. (In this case, in the absence of nonempty blacklists, the algorithm would terminate at the
end of the first night.) Furthermore, in this case PW can be computed online in O(n
2) time.
Proof. Let PM and µ be as in Theorem 4, but s.t. the top choices of all men are distinct. We
inductively define a sequence of profiles (PiW )
d
i=1 of preference lists for W and a sequence of
matchings (µi)di=1, for d to be defined below, satisfying the following properties for every i ≥ 1.
1. µi = MenOpt(PiW ,PM ).
2. If i > 1, then
{
w ∈W | µi−1(w) = µ(w)
}
(
{
w ∈W | µi(w) = µ(w)
}
.
3. PM is (µ
i → µ)-compatible.
4. Each w ∈W has µ(w) first on her preference list according to PiW .
5. Each w ∈ W for whom µi(w) 6= µ(w) has µi(w) second on her preference list (after µ(w))
according to PiW .
6. Each w ∈W for whom µi(w) 6= µ(w) does not reject any man during RP
i
W ,PM .
7. No man appears in more than one blacklist, and every blacklisted man m ∈ M satisfies
µi(m) = µ(m).
8. For each w ∈W who has a nonempty blacklist, µ(w) appears in no blacklist and satisfies
µ(µ(w)) = µi(µ(w)).
Base: Denote by µ1 the (provisional) matching describing the first night of the algorithm.
As µ isM -rational, and as eachm ∈M weakly prefers µ1(m) over anyw ∈W , PM is (µ
1 → µ)-
compatible. Denote by P1W a profile of preference lists for W according to which each w ∈
W has preference list starting with µ(w), followed immediately by µ1(w) (if µ1(w) 6= µ(w)),
followed by all other men in arbitrary order. We note that as all blacklists in PW are empty, no
rejections occur in RP
1
W
,PM . In particular, we thus have MenOpt(P1W ,PM ) = µ
1. Properties 7
and 8 follow immediately as all the blacklists in P1W are empty.
Step: Assume that µi and PiW have been defined for some i ≥ 0. If µ
i = µ, we conclude
the inductive process and set d , i and PW , P
d
W . Otherwise, let w˜
i+1 be a woman s.t.
µi(w˜i+1) 6= µ(w˜i+1). We denote by Pi+1W the profile of preference lists for W obtained by
use of Lemma 9 when applied to µ, PiW , PM , µ
′ , µi and w˜ , w˜i+1. Furthermore, we set
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µi+1 , µi
P
i+1
W
,PM
. Lemma 9 is indeed applicable due to Properties 3 to 5 for i. We now show
that Properties 1 to 8 hold for i+ 1.
Consider the following timing forRP
i+1
W
,PM : In the first part of the run, denoted byRi+11/2 , the
algorithm runs normally, except that the rejection of µi(w˜i+1) by w˜i+1 does not (yet) take place.
In the second part of the run, denotedbyRi+12/2 , afterR
i+1
1/2 converges, w˜
i+1’s rejection of µi(w˜i+1)
takes place and the algorithm runs until it converges once again. As the outcome of the Gale-
Shapley algorithm is invariant under timing changes (Dubins and Freedman, 1981), this timing
also yields MenOpt(Pi+1W ,PM ). We claim that R
i+1
1/2 is indistinguishable from R
Pi
W
,PM , while
Ri+12/2 is indistinguishable from R
P
i+1
W
,PM
µi
. By Property 6 for i, w˜i+1 does not reject any man
during RP
i
W ,PM , and thus any change to her preference list has no effect on RP
i
W ,PM , as long
as any blacklist-induced rejection of µi(w˜i+1) (the only man serenading under w˜i+1’s window
during RP
i
W
,PM ) is deferred. By Lemma 9(2), the only difference in the preference list of any
other woman w 6= w˜i+1 between PiW (which yields R
Pi
W
,PM ) and Pi+1W (which yields R
i+1
1/2
), is
in the possible promotion of menmwho prefer µi(m) over w. As by Property 1 for i, such men
never serenade under w’s window during RP
i
W ,PM , such a change has no effect on RP
i
W ,PM
either. We thus indeed have that Ri+11/2 is indistinguishable from R
Pi
W
,PM , and hence concludes
with the provisional matching MenOpt(PiW ,PM ) = µ
i; thus, Ri+12/2 is indistinguishable from
R
P
i+1
W
,PM
µi
, by definition of the latter. Therefore,MenOpt(Pi+1W ,PM ) = µ
i
P
i+1
W
,PM
, and Property 1
holds for i+ 1.
Property 2 for i+1 follows directly from Lemma 9(3). By Property 4 for i, and by Lemma 9(1
and 2), we have that Property 4 holds for i + 1 as well. Property 3 for i + 1 follows from
Property 3 for i and from Property 4 for i+ 1, by Lemma 5 and as µi+1 = µi
P
i+1
W
,PM
.
Let w ∈ W s.t. µi+1(w) 6= µ(w); thus, by Lemma 9(1), w 6= w˜i+1. By Property 2 for i +
1, µi(w) 6= µ(w) as well. Thus, by Lemma 9(2), we have that Property 5 for i + 1 follows
from Property 5 for i. Property 6 for i + 1 follows from Property 6 for i (for Ri+11/2 ), and from
Lemma 9(4) (for Ri+12/2 ).
To prove Property 7 for i + 1 from Property 7 for i, we must show that every newly-
blacklisted man m is newly-blacklisted by exactly one woman, is not blacklisted in PiW , and
satisfies µi+1(m) = µ(m). Indeed, by Lemma 9(5), any newly-blacklisted man m is newly-
blacklisted only by w˜i+1 and satisfies µi+1(m) = µ(m) 6= µi(m). Thus, in particular, by Prop-
erty 7 for i, any suchm is not blacklisted in PiW .
Finally, since by Lemma 9(5) no blacklist is changed but w˜i+1’s, in order to prove Property 8
for i+ 1 given Property 8 for i, it is enough to show that no woman blacklists µ(w˜i+1) in PiW ,
and that there exists no woman w with a nonempty blacklist in PiW s.t. µ(w) is blacklisted
by w˜i+1 in Pi+1W . The former holds since by definition of w˜
i+1 we have µi(µ(w˜i+1)) 6= w˜i+1,
and thus by Property 7 for i, µ(w˜i+1) is not blacklisted in PiW . To show the latter, let w be a
woman with a nonempty blacklist in PiW . By Property 8 for i, µ
i(µ(w)) = µ(µ(w)), and thus,
by Lemma 9(5), µ(w) is not blacklisted by w˜i+1 in Pi+1W and the proof of Property 8 for i + 1
is complete. Thus, the proof by induction is complete, as the process stops by Property 2, by
finiteness ofW .
We conclude the proof by showing that PW = P
d
W satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.
By definition of d, µd = µ; thus, by Property 1 for i = d, MenOpt(PW ,PM ) = µ. Furthermore,
the W -optimal stable matching is also µ, by Property 4 for i = d. As the W -optimal and M -
optimal stable matchings coincide, and as the latter is also theW -worst stable matching, these
constitute the unique stable matching.
By Property 7 for i = d, each man is blacklisted by at most one woman in PW . Let
w1, . . . , wnb be the women with nonempty blacklists in PW . By Property 8 for i = d,
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m1 = µ(w1), . . . ,mnb = µ(wnb) constitute nb distinct men not blacklisted in PW . Hence, there
exist at most |M |−nb = n−nb men blacklisted in PW . Thus, and since everyman is blacklisted
by at most one woman, we have that the combined size of all blacklists is at most n − nb. As
each of w1, . . . , wnb has a blacklist of size at least 1, we have that the combined size of all black-
lists is at least nb. Combining these, we obtain nb ≤ n − nb, yielding nb ≤
⌊
n
2
⌋
and completing
the proof.
Algorithm 2 follows the above construction for computing PW . This algorithm simulates
the run RPW ,PM (or more precisely, an equivalent run of the implementation of the Gale-
Shapley algorithm proposed by Dubins and Freedman, 1981), while building PW online; i.e.
the choice of who acts next and the decisions of whom each woman prefers or blacklists at any
step depend solely on the history of the run (and not on the not-yet-acted-upon suffixes of the
men’s preference lists). Thus, if participants are not required to submit their preference lists in
advance, but rather only to dynamically act upon them, then in Dubins and Freedman’s imple-
mentation of the algorithm, if the women can control its scheduling, Algorithm 2 constitutes a
strategy for the women that forces µ against every profile PM of preference lists forM .
Algorithm 2 On-line computation of PW from Theorem 4, for the special case of Theorem 11,
using O(n) additional memory, in O(n2) time. (All lines run in O(1) time, unless otherwise
noted.)
1: procedure COMPUTETHEOREM4SPECIALCASE(PM , µ)
2: // Initialize PW to P
1
W and µ
′ to µ1.
3: µ′ ←matching betweenW andM // implemented e.g. using two arrays
4: form ∈M do // n iterations
5: match m in µ′ with its most-preferred woman according to PM
6: end for
7: PW ← profile of preference lists forW
8: for w ∈W do // n iterations
9: set preference list of w in PW to (µ(w), µ
′(w), all other men) // O(n)
10: end for
11: // Initialize todo.
12: INITIALIZE(µ′, µ) // see Algorithm 1; O(n)
13: // Iterate until for every women w we have µ(w) = µ′(w).
14: while todo 6= ∅ do
15: let w˜ ∈ todo
16: // Update PW from P
i
W to P
i+1
W and µ
′ from µi to µi+1.
17: µ′ ← COMPUTELEMMA9(µ′ , µ,PM , w˜,PW ) // see Algorithm 1
18: end while
19: return PW
20: end procedure
By Lemma 10, each call to COMPUTELEMMA9 takes O(n · k) time, where k is the num-
ber of women w for whom µ′(w) is “fixed” from µ1w) to µ(w) by this call. Thus, all calls to
COMPUTELEMMA9 take O(n2) time in total.
The basic ideas of the proof of Theorem 11 are used in the proof that we now give for
Theorem 4 as well, however this proof is somewhat more delicate, as we must choose w˜i+1
carefully, and more intricately analyse the inductive step in certain cases.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let PM and µ be as in Theorem 4. We once again inductively define a se-
quence of profiles (PiW )
d
i=1 of preference lists for W and a sequence of matchings (µ
i)di=1, for
d to be defined below, satisfying the following, slightly modified, properties for every i ≥ 1.
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(Note the omission of Property 6, which causes us significant hardship below, and the addition
of Property 9.)
1. µi = MenOpt(PiW ,PM ).
2. If i > 1, then
{
w ∈W | µi−1(w) = µ(w)
}
(
{
w ∈W | µi(w) = µ(w)
}
.
3. PM is (µ
i → µ)-compatible.
4. Each w ∈W has µ(w) first on her preference list according to PiW .
5. Each w ∈ W for whom µi(w) 6= µ(w) has µi(w) second on her preference list (after µ(w))
according to PiW .
7. No man appears in more than one blacklist, and every blacklisted man m ∈ M satisfies
µi(m) = µ(m).
8. For each w ∈W who has a nonempty blacklist, µ(w) appears in no blacklist and satisfies
µ(µ(w)) = µi(µ(w)).
9. For each w ∈W who is serenaded-to during RP
i
W
,PM solely by µ(w), µ(w) appears in no
blacklist.
Base: Denote by P0W a profile of preference lists forW according to which each w ∈W has
preference list starting with µ(w), followed by all other men in arbitrary order. Define µ1 =
MenOpt(P0W ,PM ). We note that all men are matched in µ
1. Indeed, letm ∈M ; similarly to the
proof of Lemma 1, since by definitionm does not blacklist µ(w), and since µ(w)′s top choice is
m, then m must be matched by µ1. Furthermore, we thus obtain that m weakly prefers µ1(m)
over µ(m), and as µ is by definition M -rational, we have that PM is (µ
1 → µ)-compatible.
Denote by P1W the profile of preference lists for W obtained from P
0
W by promoting, for each
woman w s.t. µ1(w) 6= µ(w), µ1(w) to be second on w’s preference list (immediately following
µ(w)). Since by definition each such woman w never rejects µ1(w) during RP
0
W ,PM , we have
that RP
0
W
,PM and RP
1
W
,PM are indistinguishable. Thus, µ1 = MenOpt(P1W ,PM ). Similarly to
the induction base in the proof of Theorem 11, Properties 7 to 9 follow immediately as all
blacklists exist in P1W are empty. We note that unlike the scenario analysed in the proof of
Theorem 11, we generally have that Property 6 from that proof simply does not hold here,
even during RP
0
W ,PM .
Step: Assume that µi and PiW have been defined for some i ≥ 0. If µ
i = µ, then we
conclude the inductive process and set d , i and PW , P
d
W . Otherwise, T
i ,
{
w ∈ W |
µi(w) 6= µ(w)
}
6= ∅. For every woman w, denote by ti(w) the last night of RP
i
W
,PM on which
any man newly-serenades under w’s window. Let w˜i+1 ∈ T i with largest ti(w˜i+1). (If more
that one such woman exists, choose one of them arbitrarily.) We denote by P ′W the profile of
preference lists for W obtained by use of Lemma 99 when applied to µ, PiW , PM , µ
′ , µi and
w˜ , w˜i+1. As in the proof of Theorem 11, Lemma 9 is applicable due to Properties 3 to 5 for i.
We define µi+1 , µi
P ′
W
,PM
, and consider two separate cases when defining Pi+1W :
• If on night ti(w˜i+1) of RP
i
W
,PM only one man serenades under w˜i+1’s window, then this
night is the first on which any man serenades under her window during RP
i
W ,PM ; thus,
w˜i+1 rejects no man before or on that night, and thus, by definition of w˜i+1, she rejects
no man during RP
i
W
,PM .10 In this case, as in the inductive step of Theorem 11, we set
9We note that this proof, unlike that of Theorem 11, uses Lemma 9(4) solely to show that for every w ∈ W ,
µi+1(w) ∈ {µi(w), µ(w)}. Thus, the use of Lemma 9 could be replaced by the use of a simple variant of Lemma 7,
rendering Lemmas 8 and 9 unneeded. Nonetheless, we present these lemmas for several reasons. First, since
they provide insight into the structure underlying our solution, and also allow for both a much cleaner and more
structured proof of Theorem 11 and a more gradual introduction of the methods used in the second case of the
current proof; second, since they yield an online algorithm for the case of Theorem 11, and since using Lemma 9
in the current proof provides for improved running-time of the resulting algorithm for many inputs, by turning
iterations of the second case of this proof into (faster) applications of Lemma 8 as iterations in the proof of Lemma 9.
10An implementation note: in fact, any woman who never rejects any man during RP
i
W
,PM may be chosen as
w˜i+1 and treated as detailed in this case, regardless of whether she has the largest ti value or not (this condition is
only needed in the second case, in which w˜i+1 rejects men during RP
i
W
,PM ), resulting in an asymptotically-faster
algorithm for many inputs. The reason we nonetheless describe our proof by choosing w˜i+1 in the same manner
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Pi+1W , P
′
W (and thus µ
i+1 = µi
P
i+1
W
,PM
). The proofs of Properties 1 to 5, 7 and 8 for
i + 1 follow exactly as in the inductive step in the proof of Theorem 11 — we note that
these use only Properties 1 to 5, 7 and 8 for i, and additionally Property 6 for i, but only
to show that w˜i+1 rejects no man during RP
i
W ,PM , which we now have by definition of
this case, as explained above. It thus remains to show that Property 9 holds for i + 1.
By equivalence ofRi+11/2 and R
Pi
W
,PM , any woman w serenaded-to duringRP
i+1
W
,PM solely
by µ(w) is also serenaded-to during RP
i
W ,PM solely by him. Thus, Property 9 for i + 1
follows from Property 9 for i and from Lemma 9(5) (as µi(µ(w)) = µ(µ(w)) for any such
w).
• Otherwise, on night ti(w˜i+1) of RP
i
W
,PM , by definition of ti(·), more than one man sere-
nades under w˜i+1’s window. Denote by m˜ a man rejected by her on that night. (If more
than one such man exists, choose m˜ arbitrarily among all such men.) Note that by def-
inition of ti(w˜i+1), the man serenading under w˜i+1’s window without being rejected by
her on that night is µi(w˜i+1). Consider the following timings for RP
i
W
,PM : In the first
part of the run, denoted by R˜i1/2, the algorithm runs normally, except that the rejection
of m˜ by w˜i+1 in favour of µi(w˜i+1) does not take place (but on the other hand, neither
does she reject µi(w˜i+1)). Thus, by definition of w˜i+1, when R˜i1/2 converges, two men (m˜
and µi(w˜i+1)) serenade under w˜i+1’s window, while each of the remaining n − 2 men is
the only man serenading under the window of some woman. Thus, at the end of R˜i1/2,
there exists a unique woman wˆ, under whose window no man serenades. We note that
by definition of ti(w˜i+1), we have that wˆ /∈ T i. In the second part of the run, denoted
by R˜i2/2, after R˜
i
1/2 converges, w˜
i+1’s rejection of m˜ in favour of µi(w˜i+1) takes place and
the algorithm runs until it converges once more. Once more, as the outcome of the Gale-
Shapley algorithm is invariant under timing changes (Dubins and Freedman, 1981), this
timing also yieldsMenOpt(PiW ,PM ).
We denote by Pi+1W the profile of preference lists forW obtained by applying the follow-
ing modifications to P ′W :
1. Along the lines of Lemma 8, we set the preference list of w˜i+1 to be as in PiW , but
with m˜ promoted to the second place (immediately following µ(w˜i+1)), maintaining
the internal order of all other men.
2. For each m ∈ M who satisfies µ(m) = µi+1(m) 6= µi(m), perform the following for
each woman w /∈ T i s.t.m (strictly) prefers µi(m) over w and w over µ(m):
i. If w has no provisional match at the end of R˜i1/2 (i.e. if w = wˆ), then, once again
somewhat along the lines of Lemma 8, alter wˆ’s preferences to blacklist m.
ii. Otherwise, demotem on w’s preference list to somewhere below the man with
whom w is provisionally matched at the end of R˜i1/2.
We note that Modification 2 is well-defined. Indeed, since for every such m, µi(m) 6=
µ(m), and thus µi(m) ∈ T i. Thus, by definition of R˜i1/2,m is provisionally matched with
µi(m) at the end of R˜i1/2. Thus, m is not provisionally matched with any w /∈ T
i at the
end of R˜i1/2, and thus Modification 2 does not specify the demotion of any man “below
himself” in any preference list.
Consider the following timings, which we soon show to be well-defined, for RP
i+1
W
,PM :
In the first part of the run, denoted by Ri+11/3 , the algorithm runs normally, except that
the rejection of µi(w˜i+1) by w˜i+1 in favour of m˜ does not take place (but on the other
hand, neither does she reject m˜). In the second part of the run, denoted by Ri+12/3 , after
Ri+11/3 converges, w˜
i+1’s rejection of µi(w˜i+1) in favour of m˜ takes place and the algorithm
runs normally once more, except that m˜’s rejection by w˜i+1 in favour of µ(w˜i+1) does
on both cases above is for the sake of simplicity, in order to better reflect the analogies between these two cases.
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not take place (but on the either hand, neither does she reject µ(w˜i+1)). In the third
and final part of the run, denoted by Ri+13/3 , after R
i+1
2/3 converges, the algorithm runs
until it converges. We now show that this timing is indeed well-defined, that Ri+11/3 is
indistinguishable from R˜i1/2, that R
i+1
2/3 has the same rejections as R
P ′
W
,PM
µi
, and that Ri+13/3
has the same rejections as R˜i2/2. (The scenario analysed above, in which on night t
i(w˜i+1)
only oneman serenades under w˜i+1’s window,may be viewed in a sense as a special case
of the scenario discussed here, in which R˜i2/2 and R
i+1
3/3 are both empty.) From this timing
being well-defined, we yet again have, as the outcome of the Gale-Shapley algorithm is
invariant under timing changes (Dubins and Freedman, 1981), that this timing also yields
MenOpt(Pi+1W ,PM ).
We indeed start by showing that Ri+11/3 is identical to R˜
i
1/2. Modification 1 (when com-
pared with the unmodified PiW ) has no effect on R
Pi
W
,PM before m˜ is rejected by w˜i+1 in
that run, and thus has no effect on R˜i1/2. As in the proof of Theorem 11, by Lemma 9(2),
the only difference in the preference list of any other woman w 6= w˜i+1 between PiW
and P ′W is in the possible promotion of men m who prefer µ
i(m) over w. As by Prop-
erty 1 such men never serenade under w’s window during RP
i
W
,PM , such a change has
no effect on RP
i
W
,PM , and thus on R˜i1/2 in particular. Let m be a man satisfying the con-
ditions of Modification 2; as Modification 2 only alters the preference, regarding m, of
women thatm prefers less than µi(m), who, as explained above, is his provisional match
at the end of R˜i1/2, m does not serenade under any of their windows during R˜
i
1/2 and
thus this modification has no effect on R˜i1/2 either. By all of the above, as long as w˜
i+1
does not reject m˜ nor µi(w˜i+1), there is no difference between RP
i
W ,PM and RP
i+1
W
,PM . By
definition of m˜ and µi(w˜i+1), deferring the rejection of m˜ by w˜i+1 achieves this effect in
RP
i
W
,PM ; by Modification 1, deferring the rejection of µi(w˜i+1) by w˜i+1 achieves this ef-
fect in RP
i+1
W
,PM . Thus, we have shown that Ri+11/3 is well-defined and indistinguishable
from R˜i1/2.
We move on to showing that Ri+12/3 has the same rejections as R
P ′W ,PM
µi
. By definition
of w˜i+1, each w ∈ T i \ {w˜i+1} is provisionally matched with µi(w) (with whom she is
provisionally matched on the first night of R
P ′
W
,PM
µi
) at the end of R˜i1/2, and thus also
at the end of Ri+11/3 . Furthermore, none of Modifications 1 and 2 apply to such w. By
Lemma 9(1), w˜i+1 immediately rejects all men approaching her during during R
P ′W ,PM
µi
,
except for µ(w˜i+1). By Modification 1, as w˜i+1 is provisionally matched with m˜ on the
first night of Ri+12/3 , the only man she would not immediately reject after that night (ex-
cept for m˜) is µ(w˜i+1). Furthermore, since during Ri+12/3 (as during R
P ′
W
,PM
µi
), only one
woman is newly-serenaded-to every night after the first, we therefore have that the Ri+12/3
would stop immediately if µ(w˜i+1) serenades under w˜i+1’s window (as happens on the
last night of R
P ′W ,PM
µi
). Finally, let m be a man rejected during R
P ′W ,PM
µi
, and let w /∈ T i
under whose window m serenades during R
P ′
W
,PM
µi
. As µi(w) = µ(w), and as by defini-
tion µi(m) 6= µ(m), we have µi(m) 6= w, and thusm serenades underw’s window during
R
P ′
W
,PM
µi
following a rejection, and thus in particular, by Lemma 9(2) and as w /∈ T i,
w rejects m as soon as he serenades under her window during R
P ′W ,PM
µi
. As m sere-
nades under w’s window following a rejection in R
P ′
W
,PM
µi
, m prefers µi(m) over w; by
Lemma 9(2), m also prefers w over µ(m) (as w 6= µ(m), since µ(m) ∈ T i). Furthermore,
28
by Lemma 9(4), µi+1(m) = µ(m). Thus, Modification 2 was applied to w’s preference
list w.r.t. m. If w = wˆ, then she thus blacklists m and would thus immediately reject
him if he ever serenades under her window duringRP
i+1
W
,PM (and thus in particular dur-
ing Ri+12/3 ); otherwise, w 6= wˆ, and as w’s provisional match only improves (according to
Pi+1W ) during R
P
i+1
W
,PM , she would thus immediately rejectm if he ever serenades under
her window during Ri+12/3 . We conclude that any woman who, during R
P ′W ,PM
µi
, immedi-
ately rejects all men serenading under her window for the first time after the first night,
would reject all suchmen duringRi+12/3 as well, if any of them serenade under herwindow
after the first night; we also conclude that any other woman has the same preference list
and initial matching during R
P ′W ,PM
µi
and during Ri+12/3 , with the exception of w˜
i+1, who
would immediately reject all men except µ(w˜i+1) in both R
P ′W ,PM
µi
and Ri+12/3 , and would
accept µ(w˜i+1), in which case both R
P ′W ,PM
µi
and Ri+12/3 stop. Thus, as the only rejection on
the first night of both R
P ′W ,PM
µi
and Ri+1
2/3
is of µi(w˜i+1) by w˜i+1, we conclude that Ri+1
2/3
is
well-defined and has the same rejections as R
P ′W ,PM
µi
.
Finally, we show that Ri+1
3/3
has the same rejections as R˜i2/2. Indeed, by definition of
ti(w˜i+1), all rejections during R˜i2/2, in all nights but the first, are by women in W \ T
i.
As explained above, the provisional matches of these women are unaltered during Ri+12/3 ,
and thus are the same on the first nights of Ri+13/3 and R˜
i
2/2. As in both these first nights
the only rejection is of m˜ by w˜i+1, it is enough to show that the preferences of all women
inW \T i agree w.r.t. all men provisionally matched to any ofW \T i in both of these first
nights, as well as w.r.t. m˜. By definition of ti(w˜i+1), we have that all such men m (incl.
m˜) satisfy µi(m) /∈ T i, and thus µi(m) = µ(m). Thus, Modification 2 does not involve
demoting or blacklisting any suchm. As w˜i+1 ∈ T i, Modification 1 is irrelevant as well at
this point. By Lemma 9(2), the preferences ofW \T i are the same in P ′W as they are in P
i
W .
Thus, Ri+13/3 and R˜
i
2/2 have the same rejections. We conclude that the rejections occurring
inRP
i+1
W
,PM are exactly those occurring in either ofRP
i
W
,PM orR
P ′W ,PM
µi
. Thus, asRP
i
W
,PM
concludes with the initial matching of R
P ′W ,PM
µi
, and as each man is eventually matched
with the woman he prefers most out of those who have not rejected him, we obtain that
MenOpt(Pi+1W ,PM ) is the matching obtained by first running R
Pi
W
,PM and then R
P ′
W
,PM
µi
,
namely µi
P ′
W
,PM
= µi and Property 1 holds for i+ 1.
Property 2 for i+ 1 follows once more directly from Lemma 9(3).
By Properties 4 and 5 for i, and by Lemma 9(1 and 2), in order to show that Properties 4
and 5 hold for i+ 1, it is enough to show that for every w ∈W , Modifications 1 and 2 do
not affect the ranking of µ(w) and of µi+1(w) (if µ(w) 6= µi+1(w)). Indeed, Modification 1
affects w˜i+1 only, but leaves µ(w˜i+1) at the top of her preference list; by Lemma 9(1), this
suffices. Modification 2 only affect the preference list of womenw by demotingmen who
are not µ(w) or µi(w) on w’s preference list, and by Lemma 9(4), µi+1(w) is one of these
two. Thus, Properties 4 and 5 hold for i + 1. Property 3 for i + 1 follows again from
Property 3 for i and from Property 4 for i+ 1, by Lemma 5 and as µi+1 = µi
P ′
W
,PM
.
To prove Property 7 for i + 1 from Property 7 for i, we must show once more that every
newly-blacklisted man m is newly-blacklisted by exactly one woman, is not blacklisted
in PiW , and satisfies µ
i+1(m) = µ(m). Indeed, by Lemma 9(5) and by Modifications 1
and 2, any man newly-blacklisted is newly-blacklisted only by wˆ and satisfies µi+1(m) =
µ(m) 6= µi(m). Thus, in particular, by Property 7 for i, he is not blacklisted in PiW .
Since by Lemma 9(5) and by Modifications 1 and 2, no blacklist is changed but perhaps
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wˆ’s, in order to prove Property 8 for i+ 1 given Property 8 for i, it is enough to yet again
show that no woman blacklists µ(wˆ) in PiW , and that there exists no woman w with a
nonempty blacklist in PiW s.t. µ(w) is blacklisted by wˆ in P
i+1
W . By Property 8 for i, it is
enough to prove the former for the case in which wˆ has an empty blacklist in PiW . In this
case, by definition of wˆ, noman serenades under herwindowduring R˜i1/2, and R˜
i
2/2 stops
as soon as any man serenades under her window. Thus, only one man serenades under
wˆ’s window during RP
i
W ,PM , and since wˆ /∈ T i, this man is µ(wˆ). Thus, by Property 9 for
i, µ(wˆ) is not blacklisted in PiW . To show the latter, let w be a woman with a nonempty
blacklist in PiW . By Property 8 for i, µ
i(µ(w)) = µ(µ(w)), and thus, by Modification 2,
µ(w) is not blacklisted by wˆ in Pi+1W and the proof of Property 8 for i+ 1 is complete.
Finally, by equivalence ofRi+1
1/3
and R˜i1/2, and ofR
i+1
3/3
and R˜i2/2, any womanw serenaded-
to during RP
i+1
W
,PM solely by µ(w) is also serenaded-to during RP
i
W
,PM solely by him.
Thus, Property 9 for i + 1 follows from Property 9 for i and from Modification 2 (as
µi(µ(w)) = µ(µ(w)) for any such w).
Thus, the proof by induction is complete, as the process stops by Property 2 and by finite-
ness of W . The remainder of the proof follows verbatim as in the proof of Theorem 11. The
O(n3) time complexity follows by naı¨vely implementing the above inductive process. We note
that the only obstacle to obtainingO(n2) time complexity is the need to rerun the Gale-Shapley
algorithm in order to identify wˆ on every iteration corresponding to the second case of the in-
duction step; more formally, the algorithm runs in O(n2 · (1 + k)) time, where k is the number
of iterations of the second case of the induction step (thus yielding a best-case time complexity
of O(n2), i.e. under the conditions of Theorem 11). Recall that by Lemmas 7 and 9, the number
of all iterations is at most the number of (µ1 → µ)-cycles. Since µ is uniformly distributed
given PM (and thus given µ
1), we have that µ ◦ µ1
−1
is uniformly distributed in Sn; therefore,
the expected number of cycles in µ ◦ µ1
−1
isHn ,
∑n
j=1
1
j (Arratia et al., 2003, p. 19). Thus, by
Remark 4, we have that E[k] ≤ Hn = O(log n), and hence the average-case time complexity of
the above algorithm is O(n2 log n), as required.
A final implementation note: we observe that as long as w˜i+1 is chosen as detailed in the
proof above, then for any i, until time ti(w˜i+1),RP
1
W ,PM is indistinguishable from RP
i
W ,PM , and
that after this time, in neither run is any woman in T i newly-serenaded to. This follows since
(ti(w˜i+1))di=1 is weakly monotone-decreasing by its definition and by Lemma 9(4).
A.2 Proofs of the remaining Theorems from Section 4
Proof of Theorem 5. We start by showing that Theorem 5 holds for nb = 1 and l1 = n − 1.
Denote the members of W by w0, . . . , wn−1, and of M — by m0, . . . ,mn−1. Let µ be the
matching and PM be the profile of preference lists for M s.t. for every 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1,
both µ(wj) , mj and the preference list of mj (from most-preferred to least-preferred) is:
wj+1, wj+2, . . . , wn−1, w0, w1 . . . , wj . To show Part 1, let PW be the profile of preference lists
by which, as in Lemma 7, the preference list of w0 is m0 (with all other men blacklisted), and
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, the preference list of wj is first mj , followed immediately by mj−1,
followed by all other men in arbitrary order. Let µ′ be the matching describing the first night
of RPW ,PM , i.e. µ′(mj) , w(j+1 mod n) for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. It is straightforward to check
that Cµµ′(w0) = (w0
mn−1
−−−→ wn−1
mn−2
−−−→ wn−2
mn−3
−−−→ · · ·w1
m1−−→ w0). Thus, by Lemma 7 and by
Lemma 6(3), µ′
PW ,PM
= µ. (The interested readermay verify thatPW is the profile of preference
lists obtained by applying the above proofs/algorithms.)
We now move on to proving Part 2. Let P ′W be a profile of preference lists for W s.t.
MenOpt(P ′W ,PM ) = µ. We must show that there exists a woman whose preference list accord-
ing to P ′W consists of a single man. We consider the timing for R
P ′
W
,PM = R
P ′
W
,PM
µ′ induced by
the recursive implementation (McVitie and Wilson, 1971) of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, i.e. as
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long as any blacklist-induced rejection remains, one such rejection occurs, its aftermath runs
until the algorithm converges once more (we call this an iteration), at which point, if any other
blacklist-induced rejection remain, the process repeats. If, at any time, a woman is approached
by two men she blacklists, she arbitrarily rejects one of them in favour of the other.
We first note that on each iteration, everywoman rejects precisely oneman. Indeed, assume
that an iteration starts with a woman wj rejecting her provisional match. By definition of PM ,
this provisional match then serenades under w(j+1 mod n)’s window, who rejects either him or
her provisional match, the rejected man then serenades under w(j+2 mod n)’s window, who re-
jects either him or her provisional match, and so forth until the man rejected by w(j+n−1 mod n)
serenades under the window ofw(j+n mod n) = wj , who has no provisional match at that point,
and thus the iteration concludes. So, exactly n rejections take place during each iteration. As
RP
′
W
,PM yields µ, each man is rejected by n − 1 women during this run, and thus n · (n − 1)
rejections in total take place during it, and so the above-described timing for it consists of
n− 1 iterations. Let w be the woman whose blacklist-induced rejection of her then-provisional
match m triggers the last iteration of RP
′
W
,PM . In the previous iterations, w has already per-
formed n − 2 rejections (one in each iteration), and since in the beginning of the last iteration
she is provisionally matched with m, whom she blacklists, we conclude that the n − 2 men
she has already rejected in prior iterations are also blacklisted by her, for a total of n − 1 men
blacklisted by w and the proof is complete.
The general case of Theorem 5 follows in a similar way. Assumew.l.o.g. that l1+ · · ·+ lnb =
n − nb, by adding lis equal to zero (and thus increasing the value of nb) if necessary. Denote
the members ofW by wij , for 1 ≤ i ≤ nb and for each such i, for 0 ≤ j ≤ li; similarly denote the
members ofM bymij , for the same values of i and j. For every such i and j, we set µ(w
i
j) , m
i
j
and set the preference list of mij to start with w
i
j+1, w
i
j+2, . . . , w
i
li
, wi0, w
i
1, . . . , w
i
j , in this order,
followed by all other women in arbitrary order. The proof of Part 1 is similar to that of the
special case, with wi0, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ nb preferring m
i
0 most, and blacklisting m
i
j for all
0 ≤ j ≤ li; and with w
i
j , for every such i and for every 0 < j ≤ li, preferringm
i
j most, followed
immediately by mij−1, followed by all other men in arbitrary order. Finally, Part 2 follows by
performing the analysis of the special case for each i separately, and by observing that since
MenOpt(P ′W ,PM ) = µ, no man m
i
j is ever rejected by w
i
j during R
P ′W ,PM , and thus no such
man ever serenades under the window of any woman wi
′
k , for any i
′ 6= i and any k.
Proof of Theorem 6. The proof runs along the lines of the proof of Theorem 4, with a few differ-
ences that we now survey.
We begin by focusing our attention on W cµ. By having each women w ∈ W
c
µ blacklist all
men11, we guarantee that these women turn out to be unmatched, and can de facto ignore them
from this point on.
The base of the inductive argument is as in Theorem 4, except that we place M cµ last in
all preference lists in P0W . (The resulting matching µ
1 is thus the matching that would have
been obtained by considering only Mµ in the runs defining µ
1.) This guarantees that M cµ are
exactly the men unmatched in µ1. Before commencing with the inductive steps of the proof
of Theorem 4, we perform the following inductive step, as many times as possible (with the
same induction invariants): if there exists any woman w ∈ T i who is serenaded-to by some
m˜ ∈ M cµ during R
PiW ,PM (equivalently, who is not blacklisted by some such m˜ — the set of
all such women can be precomputed once at the beginning of the algorithm), then we denote
w˜i+1 , w. We continue the construction and proof as in the second case of the induction step
of the proof of Theorem 4 (however w.r.t. w˜i+1 and m˜ as defined here), only noting that all
women are matched at the end of R˜i1/2, and therefore Modification 2(i) never takes place. (The
11It actually suffices for each such w to blacklist allm ∈ M cµ who do not blacklist her, in addition to allm ∈ Mµ
who prefer w over µ(m). The proof is left to the interested reader.
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interested reader may verify that Modification 2(ii) is a no-op, and therefore Modification 2 is
redundant in its whole in this case.) Therefore, no blacklist is changed during this induction
step, and thus when it is no longer possible to conduct any more such steps, all blacklists in
Pi+1W are empty. The rest of the results, except for those regarding the worst- and average-case
time complexities, follow as in the proof of Theorem 4.
Let r be the number of women w for whom, when it is no longer possible to conduct any
more induction steps as above, it still holds that µi+1(w) 6= µ(w). By Lemma 9(1), r ≤ nµ − nh,
yielding the worst-case time complexity as required, via the same arguments as in the proof
of Theorem 4. For the average-case analysis, note that each induction step as above causes not
only w˜i+1 to be matched with µ(w˜i+1), but actually her entire (µ1 → µ)-cycle to be matched
with their partners in µ. As the expected combined size of the cycles containing nh elements
in a random permutation uniformly distributed in Snµ is
nh·(nµ+1)
nh+1
(Gonczarowski, 2013), we
have E[r] = nµ −
nh·(nµ+1)
nh+1
<
nµ+1
nh+1
. By Jensen’s inequality (Jensen, 1906) and by concavity of
the logarithm function, we have E[log r] ≤ logE[r] = O(log nµ+1nh+1). The rest of the analysis is as
in the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 7. The proof runs along the lines of that of Theorem 5. Assume w.l.o.g. that
l1 + · · · + lnb = nµ − nh − nb, by adding lis equal to zero (and thus increasing the value of
nb) if necessary. Define H ,
{
w ∈ W˜ | ∃m ∈ M˜ c : w /∈ Bm
}
, and note that by definition,
nh = |H|. Let {mw}w∈H be nh distinct arbitrary men from M˜ . For every m ∈ M , define
P (m) ,
{
w ∈ W˜ c | m ∈ Bw
}
. Denote the members of W˜ \H by wij , for 1 ≤ i ≤ nb and for each
such i, for 0 ≤ j ≤ li; similarly denote themembers of M˜ \{mw}w∈H bymij , for the same values
of i and j. For every such i and j, we set µ(wij) , m
i
j and set the preference list of m
i
j to start
with P (mij) in arbitrary order, followed immediately by w
i
j+1, w
i
j+2, . . . , w
i
li
, wi0, w
i
1, . . . , w
i
j , in
this order, followed by all other women in arbitrary order. Additionally, for every w ∈ H ,
we set µ(w) = mw and set the preference list of mw to start with P (mw) in arbitrary order,
followed immediately by w, followed by all other women in arbitrary order. Finally, we set the
blacklist of each m ∈ M˜ c to consist of Bm, with all other women appearing in m’s preference
list in arbitrary order.
The proof of Part 1 is similar to that of Theorem 5(1), with wi0, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ nb pre-
ferring mi0 most, and blacklisting m
i
j for all 0 < j ≤ li; and with w
i
j , for every such i and for
every 0 < j ≤ li, preferring m
i
j most, followed immediately by m
i
j−1, followed by all other
men in arbitrary order. Set the preference list of every w ∈ H to start with mw, followed
by all other men in arbitrary order. Finally, set the blacklist of each w ∈ W˜ c to consist of
Bw ∪
{
m ∈ M˜ c | w /∈ Bm}, with all other men appearing in w’s preference list in arbitrary
order.
For every w ∈ H , w’s top choice is mw, and mw’s top choice, out of all women who do
not blacklist him, is w (as all of P (mw) blacklist him), and thus w and mw are matched by
MenOpt(PW ,PM ) and no man is ever rejected in favour of mw, except by w. We thus de facto
ignoreH and {mw}w∈H henceforth. Let us consider the timing for R
PW ,PM obtained by defer-
ring the participation of M˜ c until the algorithm converges (we denote this part of the run by
RPW ,PM1/2 ), and only then introducing M˜
c into the market, until the algorithm converges once
again (we denote this part of the run by RPW ,PM2/2 ). As in the proof of Theorem 5(1), if W˜
c were
to not participate inRPW ,PM1/2 , then at its end eachm
i
j would be matchedwithw
i
j . As every such
mij prefers w
i
j over all of W˜
c (except for P (mij), who all blacklist him), we have that participa-
tion of W˜ c in RPW ,PM1/2 would not change the resulting matching. Finally, it is straightforward
to verify that at the end of the RPW ,PM1/2 , every w ∈ W˜ prefers her provisional match over all
of M˜ c, and every w ∈ W˜ c blacklists all of M˜ c who do not blacklist her. Thus, the provisional
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matching does not change at any point during RPW ,PM2/2 , and the proof of Part 1 is complete.
To prove Part 2, let P ′W be a profile of preference lists for W s.t. MenOpt(P
′
W ,PM ) = µ.
We commence by examining W˜ c. Let w ∈ W˜ c and let m be a man blacklisted by w in PW . If
m ∈ M˜ c, then by the statement of Part 2, we need only consider the case in which w /∈ Bm =
Bm(PM ); in this case, the fact that both w and m are unmatched byMenOpt(P
′
W ,PM ) implies
that w blacklists m in P ′W , as required. Otherwise, m ∈ M˜ and thus, by definition of PW ,
m ∈ Bw; therefore, w ∈ P (m) and so m prefers w over his match µ(m). As w is unmatched
in µ, we thus have that she blacklists m in P ′W in this case as well. Finally, the analysis of the
blacklists of W˜ \ H is as in the proof of Theorem 5(2), since all of M˜ c blacklist them, and all
of {mw}w∈H prefer their final matches over them; thus, only M˜ \ {mw}w∈H serenade during
RP
′
W
,PM under their windows (and these men are blacklisted by any woman in W˜ c ∪ H that
they prefer over their final match).
A.3 Proofs of the Theorems from Section 5
Theorem 9 readily follows from the following lemma, phrased in terms of the vanilla Gale-
Shapley algorithm.
Lemma 11. Let µ′ and µ be matchings and let PM be a (µ
′ → µ)-compatible profile of preference lists
for M . Let W and M be equal-sized sets of women and men, respectively. Define n , |W | = |M |. If
µ′ 6= µ, then there exists a woman w˜ and a profile PW of preference lists for W , s.t. the only woman
with a nonempty blacklist according to PW is w˜, having a blacklist consisting solely of µ
′(w˜), s.t.
µ′
PW ,PM
(w˜) = µ(w˜), and s.t. PM is (µ
′
PW ,PM
→ µ)-compatible.
Proof. Denote by P˜W a profile of preference lists forW , according to which eachw ∈W prefers
µ(w) most, followed immediately by µ′(w) (if µ′(w) 6= µ(w)), followed by all other men in
arbitrary order. For every w ∈ W s.t. µ′(w) 6= µ(w), we denote by P˜wW the profile of preference
lists forW obtained from P˜W by havingw blacklist µ
′(w). We note that P˜wW andPM are µ
′-cycle
generating with trigger w. Let w˜ be a woman for whom C
Pw˜W ,PM
µ′ is of greatest length.
We claim that wˆ , µ′(µ(w˜)) rejects some man during R
Pw˜W ,PM
µ′ . Indeed, assume for contra-
diction that this is not the case; we hence show that C
PwˆW ,PM
µ′ is of greater length than C
Pw˜W ,PM
µ′ .
Indeed, we claim that C
PwˆW ,PM
µ′ has prefix (wˆ
µ(w˜)
−−−→ w˜
m1−−→ w2
m2−−→ w3
m3−−→ · · ·wd−1
md−1
−−−→, where
(w1
m1−−→ w2
m2−−→ · · ·wd−1
md−1
−−−→ wd) , C
Pw˜W ,PM
µ′ . By definition of P˜W , and since by definition
µ′(wˆ) = µ(w˜), we directly have that C
PwˆW ,PM
µ′ has prefix (wˆ
µ(w˜)
−−−→ w˜
m1−−→. As w˜ is not serenaded-
to except on the first and last nights ofR
Pw˜W ,PM
µ′ , and as, by assumption, wˆ is serenaded-to solely
by µ′(wˆ) throughout R
Pw˜W ,PM
µ′ , the following nights of R
PwˆW ,PM
µ′ have the exact same rejections
as the second to one-before-last nights of R
Pw˜
W
,PM
µ′ , respectively, and thus indeed C
Pwˆ
W
,PM
µ′ has
the above prefix — a contradiction.
If wˆ rejects µ′(wˆ)=µ(w˜) duringR
Pw˜
W
,PM
µ′ , then by definition of P˜
w˜
W we have µ
′
P˜w
W
,PM
(µ(w˜)) =
w˜, and the proof is complete by setting PW , P˜
w˜
W . Otherwise, wˆ rejects some man m˜ in
favour of µ′(wˆ) during R
Pw˜
W
,PM
µ′ . Let PW be the profile of preference lists obtained from P˜
w˜
W by
promoting m˜ to be second on wˆ’s preference list (immediately following µ(wˆ) and immediately
followed by µ′(wˆ)). Thus, in RPW ,PMµ′ , µ
′(wˆ) = µ(w˜) is rejected by wˆ in favour of m˜ and once
again, by definition of PW , we have µ
′
PW ,PM
(µ(w˜)) = w˜ and the proof is complete. (Either way,
as no woman w rejects µ(w) during RPW ,PMµ′ , we have that PM is (µ
′
PW ,PM
→ µ)-compatible,
as required.)
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Proof of Theorem 10. The proof runs parallel to that of the special case of Theorem 5(2), by not-
ing that the first season concludes as soon as it commences, and that each consecutive season
precisely corresponds to one iteration, as defined there, and since, as explained there, n − 1
iterations are required.
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